HomeMy WebLinkAbout1982-CDPSC-rpt.pdf CHARGE TO THE CCKiITTEE
The Annual Town Meeting, held on April 14, 1922, adopted Article 39, which
instructed "The Town Manager and the Civil Defense Director to jointly appoint,
with the approval of the Board of Selectmen, a committee of seven members to be
made up of citizens of the to•. n, including individuals knowledgeable about the
effects of nuclear weapons to investigate through research and expert testimony
the implications of nuclear attack The charge to the committee shall be to
determine if ary civil defense plan for the town is realistic and feasible and
if not, what can be done "
WORK OF THE COMMITTEE - EXPERT WITNESSES
The committee met eight times during the months of August through November
and took test_mon from the following individuals
Dr John Pastore, Associate Professor of Medicine (cardiology) Tufts
University School of Medicine and Director of Cardiac-Non-Invasive Labortory
St Elizabeth' s Hospital of Boston D: Pastore's interest in and experience
with the effects of nuclear warfare began in the 50's as a member of the Atomic
Bomb Casualty Commission working in Hiroshima and Nagasaki This was a joint
medical endeavor sponsored by the Japanese and American Governments for the
purpose of identifying, and where possible treating the delayed effects of
radiation He has since spoken widely on the medical effects of nuclear war and
is currently a member of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War
Dr Kosta Tsipis Research Ph"sicist at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and Codirector of MIT's Program in Science and Technology for
International Securit• Dr Tsipis is a nuclear physicist and an expert in the
field of nuclear ,eapcns technology He has testified before congressional
committees on technical and scientific aspects of our national defense policy
Mr Sheldon Barr, Director, Division of Preventive Medicine, Massachusetts
Department o Pub is Health Mr Barr's interest in the effects of nuclear war
has- been primarily with its impact on public health and delivery of health care
since his responszbiities in the Department of Public Health include the
development and implementation of primary and secondary health promotion
programs throughout the Commonwealth and supervision of the Department' s
regional health offices
1
Mr Douglas Forbes, is Director of Planning of the Massachusetts Civil
Defense Agency Mr Forbes is a registered civil engineer, a consultant for
FEMA review committees and was president of Northeastern Engineering Associates
before coming to the Civil Defense Agency eighteen years ago He has, in recent
years, spoken widely throughout the Commonwealth on civil defense and nuclear
war
THE THREAT - NATURE OF NUCLEAR BOMBS
Although many of us recognize that nuclear bombs differ significantly from
conventional bcntos, a fel co:mnariscns a:e ne•rertheless in order as a preface to
the report
The atomic bombs of World War II, which destroyed the cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were puny weapons compared with those made and stockpiled today
The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs approximated 15,000 tons of explosive force
each Today's bombs are commonly in the one million ton range, or about seventy
times as powerful A one million ton nuclear bomb, which is about the size of a
kitchen refrigerator, packs the explosive force of a conventional bomb the size
of the entire Prudential Building Not surprisingly, the blast impact from such
an explosion can destroy or severely damage all buildings to a distance of 3
miles from its center and can cause severe damage to residential buildings at a
distance of 5 to P miles away
But nuclear bombs differ from conventional explosives in two other
important respects In a conventional explosion, the explosive material is
heated to 2,000° In a nuclear gxplosion core material reaches temperatures
greater than 10 million degrees The result is that a good part of the
destructive power of nuclear bombs is due to their incendiary effects it is as
if a small sun had come down to earth The heat from a one million ton nuclear
explosion is great enough to ignite flammable materials such as wood, clothing,
upholstery and curtaing gnd cause severe burns to exposed skin at a distance of
more than eight miles ' The resulting fire storm can engulf a much larger
area within 12 miles from the center, using up oxygen, generating carbon
monoxide and creating very high winds
Beyond these events, which occur with the first few minutes after a nuclear
explosion, there are other longer term consequences If the fireball from the
bomb touches the earth enormous amounts of material are entrained in the rising
mushroom cloud and become radioactive These are borne downwind and are slowly
deposited spreading lethal radiation over an area of about 1,000 square miles
The direction and xtent of fallout depends on wether conditions at the time of
explosion of the bomb The te:o mans shown below, identify h_gh risk areas in
the United States and the probable fallout pattern after a nuclear attack
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Today the U S has 9,000 and the Soviet Union 7,000 nuclear bombs all far
more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs These bombs are deployed
or long range missiles, nuclear powered submarines and intercontinental bombers
Ground and sea based missiles are capable of reaching their targets within
minutes of launching
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THE FEMA PLAN - CRISIS RELOCATION
Crisis Relocation is a plan developed by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to relocate people from high risk areas during a crisis that might
escalate to a nuclear attack These areas include metropolitan areas of more
than 50,000 population and almost 20g additional areas containing important
military and economic installations The plan assumes that a reasonable
warning period of from three to five days will be available for its
implementation
Although large cities and military installations constitute only a small
percentage of the U S land mass, over two-thirds of the country's population
(approximately 145 million people) live in and around these high risk areas
The FEMA plan assumes a scenario of increased Soviet-American international
tension, perhaps as a consequence of conflict in the Persian Gulf, Eastern
Europe or the Caribbean, during which the Soviet Union might activate its civil
defense plan The U S might then have three to five days to set in motion its
own civil defense plan Those evacuated under the crisis relocation plan would
go to host rural areas where they would find temporary lodging in "schools,
churches, colleges, arm9ries and other nonresidential buildings in the
designated host areas '
4
People would be asked to bring non-perishable food with them, to provide
several days food for each family For the longer term, .reliance would be on
plans for food distributors to change their normal wholesale-to-retail
distribution patterns and make deliveries to smaller towns where the people
were Prestocking the host areas is considered to be expensive gid therefore it
would be more cost effective to rely on commercial distributors
Since protection- from radioactive fallout, following a nuclear attack,
would net be adequate for all those evacuated, buildings identified as potential
fallout shelters would be upgraded by moving earth against basement walls and on
top of existing structures
Crisis relocation might last fom one to two weeks according to the
Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency During this period essential activities
in the high risk evacuated areas, such as fire and police protection food
production and distribution, and the operation of oil refineries and other
critical industries would be maintained, presumeably by volunteers
THE PLAN FOR LEXINGTON
Lexington lies well within the greater Boston risk area, a prime target for
nuclear destruction, encompassing as it does a high concentration of high tech
electronics and defense industries, important industrial and academic research
and development centers and the Hanscom Air Force Base - The evacuation plan
calls for residents to drive to Littleton N H , via route 128 to 93, a distance
of approximately 150 miles For those with no means of transportation,
government authorities are to provide transportation at neighborhood schools
EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS RELOCATION PLAN
In evaluating the civil defense plan for Lexington, the committee
considered as well the question whether any plan, regardless of its
deficiencies, is better than no plan We conclude that the civil defense crisis
relocation plan is likely to play a useful role only in the context of a very
limited nuclear threat such as, for example, if a terrorist group were to place
a nuclear device somewhere in the Boston• area In the event of a nuclear war
between the superpowers, few believe that the confict would be limited simply to
an exchange of bombs directed at strictly military targets Industrial sites
nuclear power stations and population centers would undoubtedly also be
targeted If only 10 percent of present USSR bombs were targeted on such areas
these would be sufficient to wipe out 200 cities of over 50,000 population 90%
of our key i3ndustries, 95% of our oil refineries and 70% of lesser
industries No doubt we would, at the same time, wreak equal devastation on
the Soviet Union Following such an attack, to rely on present commercial
distributors to deliver food to people is not credible New England produces
15% of the food it consumes The destruction of rails, bridges and roads the
lack of fuel and the presence throughout the country of highly radioactive areas
would make it u5:;ikely that significant quantities of food could be moved any
great distance
The very serious problem of radiation damage resulting from initially high
radiation levels and the long term effects of chronic exposure must also be
considered Crisis relocation does not necessarily assure safety from
5
radioactive fallout As the FEMA map (p 4) Indicates, such fallout is likely
to be heavy throughout all of New England, except for parts of northern Maine
The pattern of fallout is, in any event, difficult to predict since it depends
on how many bombs explode near the surface of the ground and the wind direction
at the time The best that can be said is that we can evacuate the population
tc a location with lower probability of blast and immediate radiation It is
also entirely possible that we might evacuate to a radioactively more hazardous
area A one mil_ion ton nuclear bomb exploding near the grounTican be expected
to spread lethal radiation over an area of 1,000 square miles
The crisis relocation plan outlines measures to be taken for constructing
makeshift fallout shelters in the basements of buildings in the host areas by
piling up a cubic yard of earth for every shelter space While the plan does
not address the question of how long people would have to stay in these
shelters, a stud' by the Office of Technology Assessment suggests that this
would be at least two weeks for the vast majority of the surviving U S
population The ability of evacuees to remain for this period of time in
congested shelters, without proper food, water or sanitation in order to avoid
radiation exposure is not addressed by the plan No mention is made of the
special air filters which would be required to filter out air borne
radioactivity and dust Neither does it consider the widespread radioactive
contamination of water supplif and agricultural lands Most of this
radioactivity decays rapidly, but some radioactive material created in the
nuclear explosion iT4much longer lived and decays only after hundreds or
thousands of years The long term biological effects of such increased
exposure for future generations are unknown, but are likely to be harmful
The crisis relocation plan says Little of survivability in the post attack
world and especially of the extensive and serious medical problems which would
confront survivors But no plan can be credible unless it shows how the lives
it purports to save during a nuclear attack are to be sustained afterward
Leaving aside tte problem of feeding survivors, medical experts agree that the
incidence and virulence of disease would increase greatly in the years following
a nuclear attack This would result from weakened human immune systems due to
radLation, crowd_ng during the shelter period, destruction of sanitary systems,
the presence of millions of corpses (many of which could not be properly
interred because they would be in areas of high radioactivity) and the
proliferation cf insegts, bacteria and viruses, which are relatively resistant
to radiation damage i All this is likely to occur in the face of acute
shortages of physicians and nurses, the loss of an organized public health
service and the destruction of much of the pharmaceutical industry Under these
circumstances„the return of cholera, plague, small pox and typhoid fever would
be inevitable
No civil defense plan can, of course, protect the post-attack survivors
from t g consecuences of atmospheric changes, including depletion of the ozone
layer, which might follow a nuclear war How sei5i113s these changes might be
is still a matter of speculation and controversy, ' but it is important to
note that a stud' of the problem by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment concluded that, "The effects of nuclear war that cannot be calculated
are at least as :mportart as those for which calculations are attempted
6
Several other points, made by members of the committee and by witnesses
raise further doubts about the relevance of the crisis relocation plan to
nuclear attack There is no reason to believe, as the plan assumes, that there
would be an extended warning period To the extent that the other side
perceives the relocation plan as a strategic response, it can reasonably be
assumed that counter measures would be taken This might involve some
retargeting, for which there are more than enough bombs Crisis relocation,
especially if repeated, could cripple our economy and stress our social
structure, to great advantage for an enemy Crisis relocation might reduce the
initial loss of life during the attack period, but it does little to confront
the equally grave problems of protecting and sustaining the survivors Indeed,
studies suggest that recovery would be moire rapid with fewer survivors since the
demands for food would be more mangeable When all is said and done, the
painful truth is that in a nuclear war there would be no place to hide
RECOMMENDATIONS
We advise that the Civil Defense Director continue to cooperate with the State
and Federal authorities, but that no action should be taken at this time in
implementing the current crisis relocation instructions Meanwhile, the town
bodies should assist in improving the nuclear awareness of our citizens This
micht be accomplished by providing bread circulation of this report
encouraging nuclear awareness programs in the schools, setting up a series of
public lectures and improving library resources in this area Civil defense
activities for storm, fire, and hazardous material emergencies should, of
course, remain a high priority for Lexington
REFERENCES
1 J C Mark, director Physics Division, Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratories 1947-1923, in 'The Final Epidemic, " R Adams and
S Cullen eds , Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Chicago,
Ill , 1981, p 93
2 J D Constable, chief consultant in plastic surgery, Shriners Burns
Institute of Boston, in 'The Final Epidemic," op cit , p 182
3 K. Tsipis, testimony before the committee, minutes of
September 21, 1982
7
4 A diagrammatic summary of destruction from the blast and fire resulting
from a one megaton nuclear weapon is shown below Taken from Federation of
American Scientists Report Vol 34 No 2, February 1981, p 1
DIRECT EFFECTS OF 1 MT.BLAST
(SURFACE BURST)
YON'DAMAGE TO COmAIRCIMME1 AWLDIMOI,
MOO!SAT!DAMAGE TO SMALL II SIOIXCIS, RELENT OI r1ONG
MAD MOST LIE
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MODELq DAMAD!TO COMMuaA
TYPE 00L,SEEM DAMAGI 10
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IIOM SLASI AND INITIAL SIS ON A COAL Dm SI MINIM MEM 1 MILTS IO I Mill
5 Reproduced from "U S Crisis Relocation Planning' , Federal Emergency
Planning Agency, February 1981
6 FEMA, p 1
7 Crisis Relocation Planning, Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, p 6
8 Crisis Relocation Planning, p 7 Austerity emergency rations and
other supplies for 145 million people are estimated to cost 500 million
dollars The time period through which those supplies are supposed to last
is not stated
9 According to the specific plan developed by the City of Holyoke MA
"the plan will be terminated by a peaceful negotiation of the differences
leading to the crisis - or by nuclear attack "
10 One Government study (C D^ Haaland, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, May 1977, p 364) predicts an estimated transport rate of 6% of
pre-attack 19'0 capacity might remain after nuclear attack, but this is an
average value for the courtry and could be much less for New England due
tc severe bottlenecks, especially in rail transportation, around the N 1'
metropolitan area
11 B T Feld Professor of Physics, MIT, in 'The Final Epidemic" op cit
12 Office of Technology Assessment, "The Effects of Nuclear War, OTA,
Washington, D C 1979, pp 140-145 Protection factor assumed to be 40
8
U.
13 Even after three months, a person emerging from a shelter into an.
' area that had initially had a radioactive dose rate of 100 rads/hr would,
in the course of two days, receive radiation equivalent to the maximum
allowed dosage for a year, as established by the National Council on
Radiation Protection The rapid decay of radioactivity which is often
cited to reassure the general public is misleading since what matters is
not the dose rate but the accumulated dose which decreases less rapidly
with time than does the dose rate P J Lindop Professor of Radiation
Biology at St Bartholomew's Hospital, Medical College of London and
J Rotblat, Emeritus Professor of Physics, University of London, op cit
p 121
14 The half life of Strontium-90, which may accumulate In bone tissue is
28 years carbon-14, nlesent throughout all living things, has a half life
of 5,770 years Plutonium-239, 24,00 years; iodine-129 17 000 years It
takes approximately five half lives for a radioactive material to decay to
3% of its Initial level
15 Nuclear Weapons, A Public Health Concern, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Denartment of Public Health, May 21, 1982 New England
Journal of Medicine November 12 1982 A dose of 100,000 rads may reduce
a population of microorganisms by a factor of 10, but 1,000 rads is lethal
to the human organism
16 A region in the atmosphere between six and thirty miles above the
earth which shields all living things on earth from the destructive effects
of short wavelength ultra«iolet light
17 National Academy of Sciences "Long-Term Worldwide Effects of
Multiple- Weapons Detonations, NAS, Washington, D C , 1975 P J Crutzen
Director Air Chemistry Division, Max Planck Institute for Chemistry Mainz
Germany, and I Birks, Associate Professor of Chemistry, University of
Colorado, Boulder in Ambio, June 1982
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