HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-09-06-PSSR-rpt FINAL REPORT
OF THE
PUBLIC SAFETY STAFFING REVIEW COMMITTEE
SUBMITTED TO
THE LEXINGTON BOARD OF SELECTMEN
September 6th, 2004
Edith E. Flynn,Ph.D.,
Professor Emeritus, Criminal Justice
Committee Chair
2
Acknowledgments
The Committee gratefully acknowledges the Selectmen's concerns about the
status of Public Safety in Lexington, which led to its appointment. It also extends its
thanks to Leo McSweeney, who, as Chairman of the BOS, served as liaison until March
29, 2004. After that date, Leo continued to serve as a faithful member of the Committee.
Great appreciation also goes to Selectman Richard Pagett for his considerable assistance
and sage advice. He began his services as BOS liaison from March 29th, 2004 to the
present.
The Committee drew on the expertise of many people during the course of its
information gathering. Particular appreciation is expressed to Lt. Mark Corr, appointed
by Chief Christopher Casey to serve as the Police Department's liaison and resource
person. Lt. Corr's commitment, energy, depth of knowledge of policing, and unstinting
willingness to give so much of his time, was nothing short of inspirational. The
Committee also thanks Kerry Evans who, as liaison between the Committee and the
Town Manager, provided information and insight. Both, Lt. Corr and Ms. Evans
faithfully attended meetings lasting late into the evening, often twice a week, giving
unstintingly of their personal time, over and above their regular jobs. Lexington could
not have been better served.
The Committee also expresses its appreciation to Chief Christopher Casey, LPD,
and Fire Chief William Middlemiss. Both generously gave their time to the Committee.
Chief Casey provided the Committee with a conference room. Both Chiefs were more
than helpful in the acquisition of information and data. Appreciation is also expressed to
Jonathan Hoag, Union President of the Lexington Dispatchers and Lynne A. Pease,
Executive Clerk, Selectmen's Office.
The Committee Chair gives thanks to Committee member Nancy Adler who, as a
member of Town Meeting, provided much insight into the workings of Town
government. The Committee benefited greatly from her sage advice and focused
questions.
Special appreciation goes to Officer Michael Barry, representing the Lexington
Police Department. His steadfast interest and police experience benefited the
Committee's research process. Staff and officers of the LPD were well represented by
him.
Much gratitude goes to Cleve Coats, former member of the LPD, and current
member of the Massachusetts State Police. Cleve's law enforcement experience and
solid advice were invaluable to the work of the Committee.
Great appreciation goes to Paul Keane, whose knowledge of the Town provided
valuable insight for the Committee. Paul's managerial experiences were put to good use
by the Committee in its analytical work.
3
The Committee and Chair gratefully acknowledge the unceasing,tireless, and
enthusiastic participation of George Arthur Robinson, representing the Lexington Fire
Department. Articulate and caring, the Lexington Fire Department could not have chosen
a more knowledgeable representative. George gave indefatigably of his personal time.
The work of the Committee benefited greatly from his patience, depth, and breadth of fire
fighting knowledge.
The Chair also appreciates the participation of Barry Sampson, Town Meeting
member. His direct observations of Dispatch activities, knowledge and sage advice were
invaluable to the Committee's work.
Last but not least, the Chair gratefully acknowledges the many tangible
contributions of Committee Vice Chair Joanne Schnare. She carried a significant load by
processing and analyzing the Lexington Fire Department questionnaires, and developing
multiple comparative study charts for the Committee. Without her continued and
steadfast assistance, this Report would not have been possible. Her services to the
Committee and Lexington were as invaluable as they were outstanding.
Finally, the Committee expresses its appreciation to Selectmen Dawn McKenna
and William Kennedy for meeting with the Chair and Vice Chair on matters related to the
Committee's research and findings. It also thanks William Lahey, Town Counsel for his
advice.
4
CONTENTS
Page#
Priorities and Recommendations 5 - 7
Introduction .. 8
Organizational, Procedural, and Methodological Issues 9 - 10
The Committee's Mandate: Clarification and Modification 10 - 11
Organization of the Report 11
I. Critical Issues for Public Safety in Lexington .. 11 - 16
II. Public Outreach Activities 16
III. Comparative Analysis 17 - 19
Charts 1 through 9
IV. Combined Dispatch 20 -25
V. Lexington Police Department 25 - 41
Stress and Double Shifts 41 - 43
Charts 10 through 13
VI. Lexington Fire Department 44 - 57
Charts 15 through 16
Endnotes 58 - 59
5
PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Vision Statement
• The main purpose of public safety is to save lives and property.
• Maintain adequate levels of public safety for Lexington by reinstating
into the base budget what has already been approved for FY 2005.
• It is respectfully recommend that the Board of Selectmen emphasize
leadership through action to provide citizens with adequate dispatch,
police, and firefighters and equipment to protect not only Lexington's
citizens but public safety personnel.
Fiscal Year 2005: Actions Recommended but not funded
• The consideration of public safety needs should be an integral part of all
budget deliberations.
• Any proposals concerning public safety should include a full consideration
of intended and unintended consequences.
• Initiate professional staffing, employment, and equipment studies of the
Lexington Police Department and the Lexington Fire Department.
• Create a permanent Advisory Committee on Public Safety to advise the
BOS, Town officials, and the public of all matters related to Town fire
safety, police, and dispatch protection on an ongoing basis. Committee
membership should include at least one bona fide expert each on fire
science and law enforcement.
• Begin team and morale building at the LPD
• Bring Dispatch staffing to 2-2-2 levels. (This staffing pattern would do
much to avoid double shifts). Enhance existing 911 software. Increase
Dispatch training, supervision, and access to technology. Fix up the 911
physical environment.
• Place 2002 LPD and LFD budgets into the baseline budget and thereby out
of overrides.
• Remove toxic leakage at LFD Headquarters without delay.
• Hire a full time Administrative Assistance/clerk for the Fire Chief.
• Increase training for LPD and LFD.
6
• Restore Desk Officers (ideally 5 positions but at least for B and C shifts).
• Restore the Traffic Clerk at the LPD and bike patrols.
• Acquire 8 radios for the LPD (to assure one radio for each officer) and
assure functional laptops for LPD cruisers.
• Provide unimpeded access to an equipped exercise room for the LPD.
• Begin an updating process of technology and compliance with standards
for police (national accreditation), and fire (NFPA standards).
• Budget dollars to build up resources for the replacement of 911
Emergency Technology. Prepare a Request for Proposals to replace 911
Dispatch Technology. Begin with a review of the needs of long-term
technology. Emphasis should be on the interoperability of all
dispatch/police/fire communications equipment.
Fiscal Year 2006: Actions Recommended
• Replace 911 Dispatch technology for both fire and police dispatch.
• Hire a Fire Prevention Officer and a Fire Training Officer
• Pursue a LFD compliance review with NFPA 1710 standards.
• Continue team/morale building for LPD and LFD.
• Implement full Internet access for LFD/LPD.
• Implement a LPD traffic patrol for Selective Law Enforcement, continue
accreditation process.
• Increase training for LFD and LPD.
• Initiate professional studies of LPD and LFD.
• Hire a second Parking Enforcement Officer (PEO).
• Full implementation of community policing.
• Restore the Middle School Officer(SRO).
7
Fiscal Year 2007: Actions Recommended
• Build and fully staff a Third Fire Station. This would relieve wear and
tear on current equipment and provide service to Marrett Road, Spring
Street, Concord Ave., Routes 2 and 128, and give the Town an additional
ALS Unit.
• Full LFD compliance with NFPA 1710 and 1500 Standards.
• Broaden ALS service beyond Lexington
• Implement a LFD Community Outreach Program
• New, combined, fully staffed LPD and LFD Headquarters, with a
minimum of 14 FT LFD staff per shift, full ALS status, and a fully staffed
and accredited LPD.
• More LPD and LFD training.
• More Detectives (7 days per week for B and C shifts).
8
TOWN OF LEXINGTON
PUBLIC SAFETY STAFFING REVIEW COMMITTEE
FINAL REPORT
September 6th,2004
Introduction
On December 8, 2003, the Board of Selectmen(BOS) voted to appoint a Public
Safety Staffing Review Committee. An announcement of the creation of the Committee
was posted and Lexington citizens were asked to volunteer for service on the Committee.
The Committee was charged with the following mandate:
"The Selectmen's Public Safety Staffing Review Committee is
charged with advising the Selectmen as to the effectiveness of the
Town's current levels for its public safety operations. The Committee
will assess the current levels and the impact to services from the most
recent staffing reductions, compare adjacent and comparable
community staffing models and report back to the Board of Selectmen
with various staffing options with some knowledge of the Town's
ability to pay. The Committee shall look at existing deployment and
make recommendations for more effective deployment if necessary
and will provide the Selectmen with a series of recommendations and
projected impact assuming various levels of funding."
On the 19th December of 2003 Professor Edith Flynn, who had volunteered to
serve on the Committee, was asked by Leo P. McSweeney, Chairman of the Board of
Selectmen to convene the first meeting of the Committee. The Committee met on
January 6th, 2004.
The Committee consists of the following members:
Nancy Adler(Lexington Town Meeting Member)
Michael Barry (representing the Lexington Police Department)
Cleveland Coats (member of the Massachusetts State Police)
Edith Flynn, Ph.D.(Professor Emeritus, Criminal Justice,Northeastern University)
Paul Keane (Businessman, Lexington Resident)
Leo P. McSweeney (Chairman of the Board of Selectmen and
Committee liaison until March 28, 2004, thereafter
Committee member)
Richard Pagett, (Selectman liaison from March 29, 2004 to the present)
George A. Robinson (representing the Lexington Fire Department)
Barry Sampson(Lexington Town Meeting Member)
Joanne Schnare (Office Manager, Lexington Resident)
9
Organizational, Procedural, and Methodological Issues
Committee meetings were posted and public. Town Manager Richard White
appointed Kerry Evans, Intern, to represent his office. Police Chief C. Casey appointed
Lt. Mark Corr to represent his office.
The Committee elected Edith Flynn as Chair, who also served as secretary.
Joanne Schnare was elected Vice Chair. To avoid any possible appearance of a conflict
of interest, it was decided that Committee members George A. Robinson of the
Lexington Fire Department (LFD) and Mike Barry of the Lexington Police Department
(LPD) would not vote on any Committee decisions. Even though discussions ranged far
and wide and reflected a wide disparity of opinions, the Committee was able to operate
on a consensus basis until its final meeting on September 1st, 2004. At the end of that
meeting, a vote was taken. Under the Committee's established procedures (with eight
members having a vote), six were in favor, one voted against, and one abstained.'
Although not voting to avoid any appearance of conflict of interest, the two Committee
members who represented the Lexington Police Department and Lexington's Fire
Department, are in complete agreement with this report.
At its first meeting, the Committee was informed by Leo McSweeney that the
June 2003 failed override had caused severe cuts in public safety, among other areas. It
was the task of the Committee to assess the effects of those cuts on the ability of both
Departments to serve the community and to maintain public safety. Since the Town was
in the process of reviewing its Fiscal Year 2005 budget, the Board of Selectmen hoped
for an interim verbal report from the Committee for a scheduled March 29th Town
Meeting.
In a nutshell, the LPD had lost 15 positions. Twelve Patrol Officers were laid off,
one Officer was reassigned to the School Department, while two Officers transferred to
the Framingham MA Police Department. Also lost were the Cadet Program and one
Dispatcher. The LFD had to close the East Lexington Fire Station and lost its chief and
one firefighter due to early retirement. It also lost its only administrative assistant due to
fiscal cutbacks. These losses necessitated the Committee to carefully examine the
various work functions of both Departments in view of the fact that they were serving
many functions not readily visible or clearly understood by the public. Given the
urgency of the situation and magnitude of the charge, the Committee decided that the
Public Works Department, although very important to public safety, would not be part of
the Committee's deliberations.
The Committee perceived a critical need to be of assistance to the Town on
matters of public safety and to work as quickly as possible. In order to be able to provide
at least some input into the ongoing FY 2005 budget deliberations, the Committee met
weekly (and often biweekly) to collect, develop and analyze as much information as
possible. The rapid pace of work enabled the Committee to present brief interim findings
1 On Sunday, September 05,2004,Committee Vice Chair Joanne Schnare received a telephone call from
one member of the Committee requesting his name be removed from this Report.
10
at a Joint Budget Summit of the Board of Selectmen, Capital Expenditures Committee,
Appropriation Committee and the School Committee on February 25, 2004.
Subsequently, a second, more detailed interim report was presented to the Board of
Selectmen at a meeting on April 12, 2004. That report identified urgent needs in the Fire
and the Police Departments, as well as in the Combined Dispatch Office.
Committee methodology included: (1) collection of existing data from the Town
and both Departments; (2) extensive interviews with key stake holders; (3) site visits; (4)
comparative research; (5) the development, administration, collation and analysis of two
comprehensive surveys of the Lexington Fire and Police Departments; (6) direct
observation of police, fire, and dispatch activities by Committee members; and (7)
community outreach by means of a public survey published by the Lexington
Minuteman.
The Committee's Mandate: Clarification and Modification
The Committee recognizes that its very creation shows that Lexington's
leadership cares about the effects the failed 2003 override imposed on both Departments.
However, the mandate, as written, does not reflect the fact that police and fire protection
are highly complex activities that touch upon almost every phase of community life.
Today, both police and fire science are highly evolved fields. Knowledge in these areas
requires years of study at a combination of institutions of higher learning and training
academies. Given that, it must be recognized that a proper assessment of the
effectiveness of police and fire (including any possible redeployments) as mandated by
the Selectmen, cannot be accomplished without a labor intensive, multi-months, detailed
study of direct observation and monitoring by persons cognizant of police and fire
science.
For each Department, such a study would, at a minimum, require attending roll-
calls for every shift, assessing show-up rates, investigating each absence, looking at
directed versus self-initiated activities by all Department members, examining all
administrative activities, leadership, overtime, division of labor, and deployment over a
period of time. Further, standards (to the degree they exist), regulations, operational
procedures, and daily activity reports would have to be examined. There would need to
be direct observation of field operations (all shifts), citizen/staff interactions, and crisis
management over a fair period of time.
Given the criteria outlined above, the Committee notes that it had neither
adequate resources nor sufficient time to fulfill such an exacting assessment of public
safety operations staffing levels. However, desirous of responding as fully as possible to
the Selectmen's request, it was decided to focus on the following issues:
1. Assess, to the degree possible, whether the failed override has affected
public safety and the safety of the LPD/LFD personnel.
11
2. Perform, within the constraints of time and resources, a limited
organizational analysis. This includes an examination of the
organization's environment, budgetary issues, organizational structure and
management, quantity and quality of personnel, program development
capacity, and the external environment, which subsumes issues of values,
culture, and power relationships.
3. Examine how the failed override affected patrol coverage, police tasks,
including traffic control, and special mission work.
4. Determine how the failed override has affected preventive and proactive
fire and police tasks, including community policing.
5. Establish whether emergency and non-emergency demands are being met
in a timely fashion or whether the Departmental cuts have increased
response times and at what cost to the Community and to LPD/LFD
personnel.
6. Discover whether administrative requirements, such as report writing and
training, have been affected, and whether Departmental needs and those of
the officers in both Departments are being met.
Organization of the Report
I. Critical Issues for Public Safety in Lexington
II. Public Outreach Activities
III. Comparative Analysis
IV. Combined Dispatch
V. Lexington Police Department
VI. Lexington Fire Department
I. CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PUBLIC SAFETY IN LEXINGTON
1. Lack of Understanding of Police and Fire Protection
Community discussions by Town decision-makers, the public, and various vested
interest groups surrounding the 2003 failed override, and the 2004 successful override,
clearly showed that issues of public safety were given a very low priority. Invariably,
concerns for public education, library services, and transportation, such as Lexpress, etc.,
ranked higher than any considerations related to police and fire. Since the public
12
discourse reflects the values of the discussants, the issue of beliefs and values bears
examination.2
Values are the beliefs that guide actions. They not only provide the rationale for
action but also set forth the ultimate purposes of the political entity and stakeholders
concerned. As such, values provide the Town with its reason for, and justify the
investment of, spending scarce resources on behalf of the public enterprise. Studies of
public safety have long recognized that public beliefs about the purposes of police and
fire are enmeshed in certain assumptions about the nature of these institutions. These
assumptions are, more often than not, wrong.' In fact, misconceptions abound. Police
and Fire are appreciated when they are needed. When faced with trouble, citizens expect
quick police and fire responses. Further, when victimized, citizens want and expect the
services of fully trained professionals. However, when not needed(or in times of
financial exigency), police and firefighters are often perceived as expendable and
uneconomical, and therefore subject to contraction and reduction in force at will.
The Committee unequivocally supports the various services enumerated above
and has no wish to detract from their importance to the Town. However, it also points to
long accepted cross-cultural, historical research on the relationship between law
(including counsel, mediation, and police) and the development of society's other social
institutions, such as family, religion, polity, and economy.
In their seminal work, Freeman and Winch documented that as societies evolve
and become complex, their social institutions develop sequentially with great regularity."
Each preceding institution constitutes a necessary condition for development of the next.
Further, as societies develop, their social institutions evolve along a single dimension
ranging from simple to complex as follows: a symbolic medium of exchange,
punishment of crimes through government action, religious, educational, and government
specialization, and writing. This regularity suggests not only causative relationships but
also the assignment of priorities that help stimulate the evolution of complex institutions
in modern societies.
The point here is that historically, institutions of commerce and law precede any
other institutional systems such as religion, education, and related governmental
specialization. When Lexington voters gave the largest number of their votes to Public
Safety in the June 2004 Override, they implicitly followed these historical patterns. In
other words, for a majority of Lexington voters, public safety assumed a greater priority
than any of the other services.
Lexington's 2004 vote can also be explained by considering the work of
psychologists Abraham Maslow, Chris Argyris, Frederick Herzberg, and Rensis Likert,
2 An informative example of public misconceptions of the need for public safety and the functions of police
was witnessed by the Chair and a number of Committee members at the occasion of an Appropriations
Committee meeting on April 12th,2004. At that meeting,an individual speaking for the Lexington Public
Library,unabashedly proposed that funding slated for three police officer positions be traded to ensure the
Library's pending accreditation.
13
all of whom wrote and experimented on the factors affecting human motivation." In
particular, Maslow's well-known hierarchy of needs comes to mind. Taking the form of
a pyramid, fundamental physiological needs for food and shelter form the base of
hierarchy. Safety needs come next. Both take precedence over other needs, such as the
need for belonging, esteem, and self-actualization. They do so because they relate to
physical survival. The point here is that public safety,provided by the police and fire
departments, is essential to people's survival. Therefore, consideration of public safety
needs should be the Town's first order of business, not the last.
2. Public Safety: Basic Needs as opposed to "a la Carte" Services.
Part of the Committee's mandate included the request to provide the
Town with a"series of recommendations and assess their projected impact assuming
various levels of funding." The wording seems to suggest a"you get what you pay for"
approach that is more appropriate for the world of commerce than for the provision of
public safety. To resolve this dilemma, the Committee decided to determine, to the
degree possible given available time and resources, a baseline for public safety services.
Beyond that it identifies prioritized needs for police and fire protection to be met as soon
as feasible.
3. Critical Needs Exist in the Combined Dispatch, Lexington Fire and
Lexington Police Departments
Due to the Committee's accelerated work process (documented in this Report's
subsequent discussions), it quickly identified critical needs in the Lexington Fire
Department, the Combined Dispatch, and the Lexington Police Department which, if left
unattended, constitute serious threats to community safety and to the safety of the
personnel working in those Departments.
A major Committee finding is that LFD and LPD services and resources have
gradually eroded over several years and that the budget cuts inflicted due to the 2003
failed override constituted just the "last blow." Prior to the 2005 budget restorations both
Departments were below minimally acceptable standards. The 2005 budget restorations
addressed most, but not all, of the critical needs of the Lexington Fire Department. By
contrast, the 2005 budget restorations to the Combined Dispatch and to the Lexington
Police Department have been minimal. Today, both the Combined Dispatch and the
Lexington Police Department continue to operate below minimally acceptable levels.
4. Police and Fire Safety Needs should be an Integral Part of the Public
Discussion in the Planning of new Commercial and Housing Construction
Newsprint and public discussions of capital construction in Lexington, such as
AvalonBay, approved by Town Meeting on May 12, 2004 (consisting of 387 apartment
units), and the planned Bio-Lab to be sited at a former Raytheon Company location,
identify many problems, ranging from increases in school-aged children to traffic
congestion. They also discuss solutions to some of these problems in the form of
14
remediation funding by the developer, commuter shuttles, on-site amenities, and even
contracts with Lexpress, and so on.3 It is unfortunate that most such discussions fail to
consider the added burdens these developments would place on the Town's police and
fire protection services. In particular, the planned Bio-Hazard Laboratory represents
special safety risks, given its planned production and experimentation with biological
pathogens and toxins. Fire protection and public safety would not only have to deal with
the intrinsic dangers of a bio-hazard laboratory but would also have to protect against
possible terrorist threats.
5. Creation of a Permanent Advisory Committee on Public Safety
The Committee's study of the effects of the 2003 failed override and its
subsequent work with of the Combined Dispatch, Lexington Fire Department and the
Lexington Police Department uncovered a number intrinsic issues and problems that
cannot be remedied by this Report alone. It is therefore recommended that the Board of
Selectmen appoint a Permanent Public Safety Advisory Committee to advise the BOS,
Town officials, and the public of all matters related to Town fire safety, police, and
dispatch protection on an ongoing basis. The Committee's charge should include the
following activities for both Departments. (1) Regular meetings with the
leadership/command staff; (2) Accessibility to all Department members, (3) Directly
observe field operations; (4) Review operational procedures; (5) Advise on training and
equipment needs; and most of all (6)provide a permanent bridge to the Town leadership.
Committee membership should include at least one bona fide expert each on fire science
and law enforcement. The complexity of both fields necessitates the presence of such
experts. Without such expertise on board, serious missteps would ensue, thereby
obviating the Committee's efforts.
6. Engage Professional Staffing and Deployment Studies of the Lexington
Police and Fire Departments
The Committee recommends that Lexington engage the efforts of well established
professional associations to conduct a thorough assessment of the function, resource
allocation, scheduling, and productivity of the LFD and LPD. While the Committee's
work benefited from the existence of the Standard for the Organization and Deployment
of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations
to the Public by Career Fire Departments (NFPA 1710) of the International Association
of Fire Chiefs, no such universally applicable standards exist for police.
There are important reasons for the absence of universal standards for police in
the United States. The reasons have particular poignancy for Lexington. Police
organization in this country is simply an accident of birth because the Founders had a
deep fear of national police forces for very good reasons. After all, they suffered under
the heavy handed approaches to law enforcement imposed on them by the British Crown.
The Constitution of the United States of America and several Amendments to the
Constitution (better known as the Bill of Rights) were explicitly written to stop such
3 See for example,Lexington Minuteman,Thursday,March 4,2004.
15
abuses as unreasonable searches and seizures, warrants issued without probable cause,
double jeopardy, etc. While the government of the United States is sine qua non, its law
enforcement practices (and much of the rest of our justice system) are better suited for the
18th Century than the 21st Unlike police operations in other developed countries and
sister democracies, American police consist of approximately 35,000 individual
departments. Superimposed are state and federal police forces, including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). But these were created relatively late in the life of the
Republic (1900s) and grew slowly in response to emerging crime control needs. Rather
than commit to uniformity, universal standards, and equal application of resources, each
police department functions largely autonomously, with chiefs being selected by mayors,
town managers, selectmen, etc. In principal, chiefs run their departments as they see fit.4
Not withstanding the historical evolution of police, there is a Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), located in Fairfax, Virginia. It
accredits police departments on a voluntary basis. Years ago, the Chairman of this
Committee, as a member of the Lexington Police Manual Policy Committee, strongly
recommended to the BOS and Town Meeting that Lexington pursue accreditation with
CALEA. Accreditation offers major advantages. It brings a department up-to-date in
terms of"best practices", and helps shield it in liability litigation, etc. Examples of
accredited police departments in Massachusetts include Waltham,Newton, Stow,
Northborough, MBTA Police, etc. While the LPD initiated the accreditation process, it
did not follow though due to a lack of manpower and funds.
When the tax override failed in 2003, and Police Department resources were cut,
a group called Lexington Citizens for Public Safety conducted a study, which focused
almost exclusively on comparative data from surrounding towns and on Lexington's
crime rates.5 While well intended, it is noted that the consideration of such data as the
Uniform Crime Reports, arrest rates, and crime clearance rates, is not very helpful in
justifying public expenditures for police or in measuring police performance.6 In fact,
most law enforcement experts agree that such data are largely inappropriate as a basis for
staffing and deployment decisions.' This is because they fail to reflect the complexity of
modern policing and therefore can only lead to false conclusions. Instead of bringing
about increased efficiency or accountability, budgeting in tight years tends to bring on
political interference.
About 90 percent of a police budget is spent on personnel. Fiscal contraction, as
occurred in Lexington, brings on personnel retrenchment. Junior officers are laid off due
to union and civil service provisions. Unfortunately, police work is not divided into
separate self-controlled programs which can be cut at will without seriously affecting a
Department's basic functions. The fact is that personnel cuts lead to a redirection of
police activity into the patrol units, which are the heart of policing. Specialized
personnel, such as detectives, are reassigned to support patrol activities. This is what
4 Common links exist through Training Academies, inter-agency agreements,conferences, etc.
5 See,for example,the study of Robert Beckwitt,"Article 5,The Need for Restoring our Public Safety
Resources,"Lexington Citizens for Public Safety,July 28th,2003.
6 Personal communication with the International Association of Chiefs of Police(IACP),June 2004.
16
happened in Lexington, as will be detailed in this Report in the section devoted to the
LPD.
II. PUBLIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES
To provide opportunities for public input in its assessment of the failed override,
the Committee developed a brief questionnaire asking the following questions:
Question 1: "Have you, or any member of your family within the
Lexington community, been directly affected, on a personal needs
level, by the reduction in police and fire services in the Town? If so,
briefly state how you have been affected."
Question 2: "Are you aware of any individuals who may live outside of
Lexington who were affected, on a personal needs level, by the
Reduction in police and fire services in the Town? If so, briefly state
how they were affected."
Three venues for public input were provided: (1) Publication of the questionnaire
in the Lexington Minuteman(twice); (2) Placement of the questionnaire on the Town's
Web site; (3) Offering an e-mail address and a postal address for responses.
The Committee received two mailed responses, with one indicating a concern for
the lack of police officers, especially at the High School.
There were nineteen responses to the Web site questionnaire. Of these, seventeen
were in the negative to both questions. One response noted that the respondent needed
help with a neighbor's dog, a pit bull, and was told that"no one could help." Another
response noted:
"Six weeks ago, on January 27th, I fell and broke my hip. It was 11:30 on a
Friday night. We did not wait long for the Fire Department to come, but
then we had to wait 35 minutes for an ambulance to come here from Woburn.
I am just grateful that I did not suffer a stroke or a heart attack, because that
35 minutes could have meant life or death."
There were two e-mail responses, negative on both questions.
In summary, the Committee's effort brought twenty-three responses, with three
respondents reporting negative effects. However, one of these incidents, had it been life
threatening, could have resulted in a citizen's death and made Lexington vulnerable to
litigation. On the surface, the Committee's experience with public input would seem
disappointing. But the results do put into stark relief a previous point in this report:
Police and Fire services are appreciated when needed But when they are required they
must deal with life-threatening situations, where seconds and minutes spell the difference
between life and death.
17
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The Committee spent considerable time debating the collection and analysis of
comparative data on public safety practices and programs offered by Lexington's
neighbor communities. As pointed out earlier, such data are questionable in their utility
for public safety decision making for a variety of reasons. Of particular concern is the
validity and reliability of statistical comparisons, which are seriously jeopardized by
significant differences in definitions, time frames (in which jurisdictions collect their
information), and the categorization of services. Rather than"compare apples with
oranges," or cherry-pick the information to make its points, the Committee selected basic
data points, such as the number of residents, total operating budgets, budget expenditures
per capita, number of dispatch, police and fire personnel, number of fire stations, etc. and
presents these in straightforward graphs and measures of central tendency.
Given the many caveats, the graphs and charts in this section are best viewed as
snapshots of public safety practices in neighboring communities and beyond.
The comparative analysis begins by looking at key program expenditures of the
Town of Lexington for the past four years. Chart 1, Town of Lexington—Program
Budget traces public expenditures for police and fire from Fiscal Year 2001 to Fiscal
Year 2004. It also shows percent changes resulting from the 2003 failed Override,
overall percent changes since 2001, and compares this information with expenditures for
Community Services, Education, Culture and Recreation, Social Services, and Town
Government. A quick perusal of the chart shows that the failed Override resulted in
Public Safety experiencing the second largest cut, 10.2%, after Social Services which
were reduced by 20.2%. Of the six programs selected in this analysis, only two received
increases, Education, which received an additional 2.2%, and Community Services
(DPW), which grew by 1.2%. The latter increase is attributable to an increase in the
Town's water and sewer `enterprise' funds.
Looking at program funding changes from Fiscal Year 2001 to Fiscal Year 2004,
one sees healthy growth in Education(18.18%), Culture and Recreation (8.98%),8 and
Community Services (5%), very modest growth in Town Government(0.45%), severe
cuts in Social Services (-17.3 7%), and a tangible decline in Public Safety (-3.33%). It is
noteworthy Lexington's population grew since 2001. So did construction,traffic volume,
and the demands on both police and fire services. Most important, Chart 1 clearly shows
that cuts to Public Safety began long before the 2003 Override, and that the 10.2% cut
inflicted on its 2004 budget was simply the latest and most severe setback
Chart 2, Police Department Staffing compares Lexington(pre- and post
Override) with fourteen (mostly neighboring) communities in terms of the number of
sworn police officers, police per 1,000 population, total 2003 and 2004 operating
budgets, per capita FY 2004 budget, percent change in operating budgets from 2003 to
For example, at the time of the Committee's work, complete data for 2003 were not yet available from
many communities. There is also much variation in specific budget categories. For instance,the"public
safety"category in Lexington includes EMS(Emergency Medical Services),Building Inspections, and
Forestry.
8 The Committee fully recognizes that Recreation services are funded by Town`enterprise' funds.
18
2004, miles of public roads, population size, and the number of dispatchers. The chart
also features the dispatcher breakout categorized by police and fire fighter personnel.
The chart shows that Lexington, after the failed Override, had the lowest ratio, 1.4
of police officers per 1,000 residents of any comparison community. In terms of actual
numbers, Lexington, with a population of 30,355, had 41 police officers. Only three
communities with significantly lower populations, Bedford (12,595), Concord (16,993),
and Winchester (20,810), had fewer police officers. Even with the FY 2005 staffing
restoration, Lexington, with 47 sworn officers, continues at the very low end of staffing
patterns. Only Melrose (population 27,134), Winchester (population 20,810), Wellesley
(population 26,613), Concord(16,993), and Bedford (12,595) have fewer police officers.
Nevertheless, Lexington's small Police Department has to cover the highest public road
mileage (153.39). Only Chelmsford has more public roads (186.99).
Chart 3, Police Department Staffing: Sworn Officers by Town and
Populations graphically demonstrates that Lexington's police officers (pre-and post
override) serve larger populations than do police departments in the majority of the
comparison communities.9 For example, Burlington, with significantly fewer residents,
has a much larger number of sworn officers than does Lexington. The FY 2005 budget
restorations do not begin to catch up with most comparison communities.
Chart 4, Sworn Officers: Ratio and Population compares the number of sworn
officer per 1,000 population and population size. It illustrates Lexington's lowest ratio of
sworn officer compared to other towns, with the exception of Arlington. However,
Arlington's ratio of officers to population is better.
Lexington's Combined Dispatch situation looks equally bleak. There are seven
dispatchers. Only Winchester, Concord, and Woburn have fewer dispatchers. Concord
and Winchester have significantly fewer people to serve. Only Woburn, with its five
dispatchers, serves a larger population. However, all of its thirty-nine firefighters are
fully trained as dispatchers for all shifts. Chart 5, Dispatchers by Town Populations
graphically illustrates these points.
It is noted that Lexington's 2005 budget restoration does provide for the hiring of
one additional dispatcher. However, this addition does not change the equation in any
significant way because coverage of one full-time (FTE) dispatcher requires the hiring of
an average of 5.5 to 5.7 persons, to provide the requisite coverage of 24 hours per day,
seven days per week (24/7).
Chart 6, Fire Department Staffing compares Lexington (pre-and post-Override)
with the same fourteen communities in terms of operations employees, fire fighters per
1,000 population, 2003 and 2004 budgets,per capita expenditures, number of fire
9 Sworn Officers are those with general arrest powers. In Lexington, sworn officers are all full-time and
part-time police officers including patrol, detectives, and supervisory officers. All officers are sworn into
service under Massachusetts General Law(M.G.L.)41, Section 98,which includes all ranks but excludes
special police officers and civilian support personnel(including brown uniformed but unarmed officers).
19
stations, public road mileage, and population. The Committee findings are similar to
those found in police staffing. Lexington has a ratio of 1.71 operations employees per
1,000 residents. This datum includes all staff with the exceptions of the chief and
secretary. Lexington has 52 operations employees. Only Melrose (population 27,134),
Winchester (population 20,810), Bedford(population 12,595), Tewksbury (population
28,851), and Concord (population 16,993), have fewer fire-fighters. The post-Override
closure of East Lexington's Fire Station put the Town into the same league as Bedford,
with one fire station serving a population of 12,595, and only 79.86 public road miles to
cover.
Even with the FY2005 budget restoration and two functional Fire Stations,
Lexington remains at the low end of the comparison communities. There are two fire
stations in Winchester, Wellesley, Concord,Needham, and Burlington. The remaining
Towns each have three fire stations or more. As will be discussed in the Section V of
this Report, Lexington needs to pursue the acquisition of a third fire station rather than
consider closing one of its stations, if it wishes to catch up with the Town's existing and
growing fire safety needs.
Chart 7, Operations Employees by Town and Populations, graphically
demonstrates the comparatively low number of fire fighters in Lexington.
Chart 8, Operations Employees by Town and 1000 Population depicts the
ratio of operations employees by 1,000 residents by Town, for Fiscal Year 2004. Chart
9, Fire Stations by Town and Populations graphically demonstrates the severity of the
FY 2004 budget cut on the Town's Fire Department: Lexington had one Fire Station like
Bedford. Only Bedford has one-third of Lexington's population and half the public road
mileage.
As previously outlined, the next section of this Report discusses in detail the
Committee's findings on the Town's Combined Dispatch Office (911).
20
IV. COMBINED DISPATCH
Lexington's current dispatch system grew out of a major crisis in Town during
which a citizen died. An administrative inquiry into Lexington's emergency response by
Ralph D. Gants, Palmer& Dodge (Gants Report) describes the incident as follows:1°
"At roughly 5:30 a.m. on Sunday, August 1992, Kathleen Dempsey telephoned
the emergency line of the Lexington Fire Department in an operator-assisted call
and told the dispatcher that she had been attacked. She stated her address, but the
dispatcher did not hear it. The Lexington Police Department was not notified of
the call until 10:47 a.m. that morning, when another dispatcher listening to the
recording of the call heard the address. Patrol cars were immediately sent to the
address. When the police arrived, they found the body of Kathleen Dempsey."
The Gants Report fully investigated the incident. It also proposed a series of
administrative actions and recommended fundamental improvements to the Town's
emergency response dispatch systems. In particular, the Gants Report noted as follows:
"Indeed, a consolidated joint police-fire dispatching center, physically located at
the police station, thoughtfully planned, adequately housed, equipped, and staffed,
and blessed with the wholehearted support of the leadership of the Police and Fire
Departments, could demonstrably improve the efficiency, supervision, and cost-
effectiveness of public safety dispatching in the Town of Lexington(Page 32)."
With regard to staffing, the Gants Report recommended that a Combined Dispatch
Center should mean two dispatchers on duty at all times..."except perhaps from midnight
until 8:00 a.m." However, the Report clearly qualified the single dispatcher during the
night shift coverage by noting that the "dispatcher would not be alone if the center were
located in the police station; the police desk officer, who should also be trained in
dispatching, would be available to offer assistance, relief, and guidance (Page 33). "
As a result of the Dempsey tragedy and the Gants Report's recommendations, the
current Combined Dispatch System was located at the Lexington Police Department.
Historically, Lexington's Dispatchers have asked for nine to ten dispatcher positions to
get the job done. For several years, the Combined Dispatch(911) employed nine full-
time dispatchers. By 2002, the Unit had shrunk to a total of eight dispatchers. The failed
Override resulted in the loss of still another position. Today, the Combined Dispatch
operates with seven full-time dispatchers, supplemented by part-timers.' The part-time
pool consists of six persons.12 Current shift coverage consists of two dispatchers during
the day shift, two dispatchers during the evening shift, and one dispatcher during the
10 Ralph E.Gants,Palmer&Dodge."Report of the Administrative Inquiry into the Lexington Fire
Department's Delayed Emergency Response to Kathleen Dempsey's Call for Assistance." (Report to
Town Manager Richard J.White and the Board of Selectmen).Boston,MA.,21 September, 1992.
11 The Dispatcher Union temporarily agreed that the Town could use part-timers on an"as needed"basis to
avoid expensive overtime.
12 Of part-time dispatchers two had been LPD cadets, one is a firefighter,and one is a fire captain in
Melrose,MA.
21
overnight shift(2-2-1). Combining police and fire (911) made sense financially. In
general, service probably improved. However, some specialized knowledge, such as fire
fighting equipment and communications has probably been lost in the process.
Current staffing and work patterns mean that in 2004, the Town's Combined
Dispatch has fewer dispatchers than the Gants Report deemed necessary in 1992.
Even with the restoration of one additional dispatcher in FY2005, the numbers do
not rise to the level of the 1992 recommendations. The Gants Report stated explicitly
that there should be two dispatchers per shift at all times. As previously noted, it takes 5.5
to 5.7 persons to fill each position 24/7, 365 days per year. Thus 11.0 to 11.4 persons
would be the minimum required. However, with the recent FY 2005 hiring of one
dispatcher, the total rises only to 8. This means that twelve years after the Gants
report was issued,we are still at least three persons short.
Nationally, dispatch work has evolved over time. It has become specialized and
professional. Dispatchers must complete training at the Dispatcher Academy (held at the
Massachusetts Fire Academy). The training is conducted by APCO, a nationally
recognized training academy for 911. The curriculum includes the proper handling of
medical emergencies and 911-fire-training. Lexington's Dispatchers work shifts similar
to those of the LPD officers. In general, they work four days and have two days off per
week. Dispatch shifts break out as follows: The overnight shift runs from 11 p.m. to 7
a.m.; the day shift runs from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.; and the evening shift from 3 p.m. to 11
p.m.
A well functioning 911 system is essential for community safety and well-
being. When properly staffed, organized and equipped, 911 is one of several important
layers of support that exist between a town's residents, the police patrols in the
community and on the road, and a well functioning Dispatch Desk. Dispatchers perform
two distinct roles in fire fighting and medical emergencies: they take calls and they
dispatch. They must understand ambiguous telephone calls. They must make precise
judgments about these calls. They must"multi-task" and perform triage without a second
thought. And they must interpret the caller's information accurately and determine which
police and/or fire resources have to be dispatched to the location of the emergency.
Dispatchers have to make split-second decisions daily. Often, these decisions make the
difference between life and death. The Gants Report compared the role of dispatchers to
those of a radio operator in battle. It is essential that dispatchers have an intimate and
specialized knowledge of fire fighting requirements, communications, and the
community (streets, addresses) in which they work. Training, experience, and proper
supervision are sine qua non for well-functioning 911 systems.
Before the failed 2003 Override, Lexington's Combined Dispatch was backed up
by Lexington's Desk Officers 24/7. With the five Desk Officer positions abolished and
not replaced with the successful 2004 Override, dispatch work has become increasingly
difficult and stressful. In 2003, Dispatch received a total of 77,100 calls, of which 12,850
required the dispatch of fire, police, and medical services personnel. Their monitoring
duties include (but are not limited to) seven 911 lines (five 911 trunk lines and two direct
22
dials, all of which have TTY capability (hearing impaired equipment). These lines must
be answered in 4 rings or they are automatically transferred to Bedford, which is
Lexington's 911 backup. In turn, Lexington backs up Bedford, Hanscom, and Lincoln.
Anytime an error is found in the caller data, Dispatch must fax that information to the
Verizon Telephone Company. Dispatch work currently includes much clerical labor,
computer entry, the watching of prisoners in the detention cells, monitoring the cameras
scanning the outside of the LPD building and message taking. There are 12 other
telephone lines which produce a constant volume of calls for fire, police, medical, roads
(ice, snow, potholes, flooding, and trees down), animal control and numerous
administrative calls. On nights, weekends and holidays, Dispatch must also answer the
DPW, Water, Sewer, and Dump calls. Also included in their duties is the monitoring of
the Fire Alarm System, the Mutual Aid Fire Alarm System for surrounding towns, the
METRO Fire Alarm system, which includes most of the cities and towns inside of Route
128, BAYPERN, and NEMLEC. The last two systems manage police information and
involve requests for highly trained special units, such as SWAT teams. Dispatch also
follows the Hospital Status Monitor to ascertain, before a patient is transported, if the
hospital is open and has the level of service the patient requires. All incoming 911 calls
and all dispatches of fire and police must be entered into the computer and printed.
Dispatch furthermore monitors the surrounding towns' fire and police frequencies for
accidents that may require Lexington's assistance. When national terror alert levels
change, Dispatch must notify certain people in Town. During nights, weekends, and
holidays, Dispatch must monitor the alarm system for the Sewer Pumping stations.
Further duties include the handling of routine telephone inquiries, requests for details,
requests for directions, paperwork for courts and numerous background, license, and
registration checks. Dispatch must maintain the information it needs for performing the
work. There are numerous volumes containing procedural instructions (such as
emergency medical procedures) and data (such as listings of missing or stolen property).
To access any of that information, specific formats and codes must be remembered.
Today, Lexington's Combined Dispatch works far beyond the parameters of its
contract with the Town. Many times dispatchers cannot take a break. Staffing is possible
only by personnel taking on double shifts13 and by "yielding" on vacation requests. To
reduce overtime pay, dispatchers are given time off. Currently, workers have accrued
much time off but cannot use it because the 911 system must literally be kept"afloat."
The Committee's public outreach and direct observations documented incidents
that indicate that Lexington is less safe today because of the changes that have been made
in the public safety arena since the failed Override. Cutting 911 staff is one such change,
especially when coupled with the abolition of the Police Department Desk Officers. The
FY 2005 restoration of one dispatcher does not change the equation.
The Committee has identified a number of issues and problems with the current
Combined Dispatch which, if unaddressed, would raise the Town liability if another
critical incident were to occur:
13 The issues of double shifts and their relationship to stress,is discussed in detail in Section V on the
Police.
23
• The Combined Dispatch is understaffed—and backup nonexistent. Staffing
should consist of two dispatchers per shift (2-2-2). They should be supported by
Desk Officers, preferably 24/7.
• Lexington's Dispatchers must go back and forth between three different
computers with aging software. More sophisticated 911 software exists and would
improve service, but Lexington does not have it.
• Members of the LPD and LFD cannot directly communicate with one another in
the field because their equipment is incompatible. As a result, they must go
through 911.
• Some LPD Officers in Charge (OIC) have not been trained in the handling of fire
calls. This issue is particularly critical during night shifts, when there is but one
dispatcher on duty.14
• Staff reduction has resulted in inadequate supervision of dispatcher activities.
New dispatchers, in particular, must have better supervision than is currently
provided. In the absence of Desk Officers, the OIC is frequently distracted by
other police business. And lack of proper supervision invites mistakes.
• Dispatchers and especially new employees need training. As early as the 1992
Gants Report training was identified as a critical need. This need persists and
should involve formal training, annual updates, on-the-job training, and informal
training, such as trainees accompanying police and fire fighters before going on
line.
• Multiple emergencies result in some telephone calls not being answered.
• The current"call-back" system for Dispatchers may take as long as 45 minutes.
This is a long time, during which much can go wrong, especially if the initial
communication was less than clear.
• When the volume of calls is high, they are currently being "juggled." If these
calls involve medical emergencies, such as cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR),
or choking incidents, the juggling can lead to serious mistakes. And mistakes, the
Committee was informed, happen every day.
• Current staffing patterns afford no "safety net" for the Town dispatchers. This
means that there is no "downtime" after critical incidents. This adds to the high
stress experienced by the dispatchers.
14 Belmont,with a much lower population than Lexington,has ten dispatchers and two lieutenants
supervising them. Belmont even has telephones installed in the station restrooms.
24
• Fire calls or medical emergencies require dispatchers to stay with the radio. If
other emergencies develop at the same time, they represent an invitation for
disaster.
• Dispatcher morale is low. This should not be surprising, given perennial
understaffing, using part-timers as stop-gaps on a regular basis, and working
double shifts.
• Police Department Detainees should never be exclusively watched by
Dispatchers. The latter must devote their full attention to the handling of
emergency calls. During such times, detainees could easily hurt themselves
(including suicide). Looking periodically at the closed circuit television screen
focused on the detention cells does not assure detainee safety and puts the Town
at significant risk.
• The physical facility in which the Combined Dispatch must work is nothing short
of appalling. The room is long and narrow. It is uncomfortably hot in the
summer and too cold in winter. The layout is drab,the chairs and tables
antiquated and uncomfortable. This situation should be remedied as soon as
possible.
In summary, twelve years ago, the Gants Report identified"failures of leadership,
communication, training, and equipment" as key variables in the Dempsey tragedy.
Sadly, these issues persist to the current day. Twelve years ago, Kathleen Dempsey's
father hoped that her tragedy would become a catalyst for the preservation of life in
Lexington. He noted that"...Lexington can do greatest honor to her memory by
creating a dispatching center and an emergency response system that will serve as a
model for the nation, and ensure to the extent humanly possible that what happened to
her will never happen again(Page 36)." The Committee notes with sorrow that Mr.
Dempsey's hopes have yet to come true.
Before turning to the next Section on Police, one more point is in order. The
Committee understands that there are currently discussions about developing a
Combined Dispatch with Lexington, Arlington, and Belmont.15 While there is nothing
intrinsically wrong with searching for alternative modes of service deliveries for
public safety, such activities should not be solely driven by concerns with cost
savings. Instead, they need to consider the full parameters of public safety and the
fact that split seconds and intimate community knowledge can spell the difference
between a citizen's life and death. Therefore, it might be advisable to give priority to
Lexington's current needs first. Also, Section I, point 5, recommending the creation
of a Permanent Advisory Committee on Public Safety with at least one bona fide
expert in police and fire safety, is relevant here. Implementation of this
recommendation and including at least one member of such a committee in any
discussions of public safety would help ensure that discussions would go beyond
15 Personal communication with Paul Hamburger of the Town's Appropriations Committee,July 2004.
25
parochial concerns as far as fire fighting, dispatch, or police are concerned. Thus, a
repetition of what happened to public safety during the 2003 Override might well be
avoided.
V. LEXINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
Introduction
The literature on police is diverse and complex. Few people really understand the
police function. Understanding police requires understanding our democracy, legislative
process, and the intricacies of the criminal justice system.16 It also calls for a realistic
assessment of the capacity of the criminal justice system to meet public expectations and
requires an in-depth understanding of the social, political, and behavioral problems that
exist in society.17 Misconceptions concerning the police role center around two extremes:
crime fighting and traffic control. In reality, policing is extraordinarily complex. Ample
research describes the diversity of police work.18 For example, in medium sized
municipal jurisdictions, only about 10% of calls for police assistance involve criminal
behavior as such. About 30% involve "order maintenance" issues, such as the
management of disputes. The remaining 60% of the calls involve community services
and the management of non-criminal situations. Police are the first responders to a broad
range of social and individual problems. Accessible twenty-four hours a day, police must
guard the safety, health and welfare of the social body.
Order maintenance implies consensual resolution of conflict situations. The
concept is often used synonymously with such terms as social services or social work.
Activities include, ceteris paribus, performing the functions of family counselors,
working as agents of socialization of potential delinquents, and engaging in a myriad of
roles usually associated with more specialized agencies of social control. Some scholars
have described police work as "situational management." According to this view, order
maintenance becomes the central activity of law enforcement and involves enforcement
duties and social work simultaneously, in an effort to resolve conflict situations.
Democracy and police are interdependent. The very functions of free society
depend, in large measure, on how effectively police discharge their duties.19 We look to
police to protect our civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, free
elections, etc. We expect police to protect us from predators, to give us a sense of safety
and security, and to facilitate pedestrian and vehicular traffic. In short, how police
discharge their many duties affects, to a large degree, the quality of our lives.
16 Herman Goldstein,"Reshaping the Police Function: The Problem-Oriented Approach,"January 17,
1989,page ii.(Draft of Textbook). In the field of criminal justice,Herman Goldstein is considered to be
the father of community policing.
17 Ibid,page iii.
18 James Q.Wilson.Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight
Communities. 1982.Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.
19 Herman Goldstein.Policing a Free Society. 1977. Cambridge,MA:Ballinger,(Page 1).
26
Understanding modern policing is made even more difficult because of a number
of conflicts inherent to the police role. First, police are invested with the awesome
authority to arrest, search and detain citizens. Police are the only social institution vested
with the authority to use force to enforce the law and to maintain order. Police are often
feared because of that authority. Second, conflict results from a very real discrepancy
between public expectations and the reality of what police can do. Police did not create
the social conditions with which they are expected to deal, yet they are blamed when
things go wrong. Finally, there is conflict among police regarding their role in society.
Some reject the social service functions and prefer to focus on law enforcement. Others
may welcome the social service role and derive much satisfaction from it. Police
leadership, in turn, may reflect the same points of view, considering the close normative
influence of the police subculture.
Community Policing
Community policing is a philosophy that promotes and supports organizational
strategies to address the causes of crime and reduces the fear of crime and social disorder
through problem-solving strategies and community partnerships. It represents a
fundamental shift from traditional reactive policing. If effective, it means the absence of
crime and disorder. It looks upon the community as a partner in the policing enterprise
and no longer as a passive consumer of police services. True community policing
empowers police officers, decentralizes command, and encourages innovative problem
solving.20 Many scholars view community policing as the best strategy available for
reducing authoritarian style of policing and for improving police-community relations.
Today, there are many kinds of community policing. Some assign officers to
neighborhoods, organize training programs for community leaders, and are characterized
by a"bottom-up" approach to deal with community problems. While not always
effective, research does show that community policing reduces the level of fear in
communities. Community policing goes to the heart of quality of life issues. Since
police cannot be everywhere, the approach uses activities such as neighborhood watch
programs to make it more difficult for criminal to go about their business unnoticed. In
essence, community policing is a problem solving approach. It does not necessarily
mean saturating the community with blue uniforms.
Community policing is not a panacea. There are many problems and issues
connected with it. For example, almost every police department has a different definition
of community policing. Many departments define it in terms of administrative areas
traditionally used by police departments to allocate patrols. Others simply pay lip service
to the concept and go on as before. Most approaches develop at least some degree of
partnership between the police and the community. In general, departments turn to one
of three strategies to implement community policing: deployment, crime targeting, and
20 Bureau of Justice Statistics. Community Policing in Local Police Departments,1997 and 1999.
Special Report.Washington,D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics.February 2001.
27
collaborative efforts.21 Deployment strategies include such activities as bike patrol, mini-
stations, etc., with residents doing little more than provide information to the police.
Collaborative strategies are best. In this approach residents participate in problem
identification and problem solving. Included here are very active advisory councils.
Other efforts include citizen academies. Research shows that smaller police departments
tend to rely on long-established social control mechanisms and see little need for
additional strategies. Key factors associated with sustained community policing are:
(1) a favorable political environment, (2) police leadership, (3) system-wide support
within the police departments, and (4) willingness of residents to cooperate with police.22
Continuing citizen participation is also contingent on a number of issues within
and outside of the police department: (1)there must be a supportive political environment
in which local political leaders are totally committed to the success of community
policing, (2) there must be structured opportunities for feedback to and from the
community. This, in turn, calls for procedures to assure that once problems are identified
by the community, police will return to those same sources to report on progress, lack of
progress, and jointly determine future problems solving activities, (3)police departments
must also establish several practices designed to sustain community policing. These
practices include specialized training for supervisors and the rank and file. Continued
training is essential. Community Officers must be assigned on a permanent (non-
rotating) basis. This is critical if officers and residents are to develop relationships that
lead to active crime prevention. Another factor involves organizational decentralization.
Officers must be empowered to make their own decisions. Finally, community policing
must have the wholehearted support the police leadership.
Before the failed override, the LPD had implemented a number of elements of
community policing. The Department decentralized decision making. There was a bike
patrol and a police citizen academy. The Department had initiated a community survey to
provide feedback to the Police Department and assess citizen perceptions of the Town's
policing efforts. The public feedback was very favorable.23 There is also a Police
Manual Committee to review the Police Department Manual and make recommendations
at least once a year for revisions, amendments, and additions.24 However, given the small
size of the LPD, and its perennially limited resources, it would have been unrealistic to
expect the Department to implement community policing in the terms delineated above.
As discussed in the following paragraph, the LPD was not able to designate sworn
personnel as community policing officers per se, with exception of the School Resource,
Family, and Narcotics Officers. Institutionalized collaborative efforts and structured
21 Albert P. Cardarelli,Jack McDevitt and Katrina Baum. 1996."The rhetoric and reality of community
policing in small and medium-sized cities and towns."Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of Criminology, Chicago,IL:November 22, 1996.
22 This section of the community policing discussion is indebted to Cardarelli's and McDevitt's research on
community policing cited in footnote 19.
23 Jennifer Balboni, Shea Cronin, and Jack McDevitt. 1999.Lexington Police Community Survey.
Boston,MA.: Center for Criminal Justice Research,Northeastern University.
24 The Police Manual Committee meets once a year. It is not designed to provide public feedback on public
order or crime problems.
28
feedback to and from the community did not, and do not exist. Most important of all,
there has not been a particularly supportive political environment for the LPD.
Baseline Levels for Police Services
The issues of public safety and the determination of baseline levels of police and
fire services were thoroughly explored by the Committee. What is safe? What is safe
enough? What are the baseline levels for public safety service? Nationally, there is much
debate on these issues. Unfortunately for Lexington, these issues have become overly
politicized over the past few years, much to the detriment and demoralization of both the
Police and Fire Departments. A more dispassionate discussion shows that these questions
are relatively easy to answer for fire services, given the existence of National Standards
for Fire Departments. For police, as previously discussed, baselines are more difficult to
establish. Nonetheless, some answers can be provided by first looking at how LPD
compares with local police departments nationally. Thereafter, the Committee's own
assessment through interviews and questionnaires are useful.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics (U.S. Department of Justice)provides periodic
reports on law enforcement management and administrative statistics. In 2001, the
Bureau published a national picture of Local Police Departments.25The following data
are relevant to this Report:
• The average number of employees of police departments serving a population
of 25,000—49,999, has a total number of 82 persons. Of these, 64 are full-
time Sworn Officers, 17 are civilian workers and 9 are part-time employees.
Part-timers consist of 1 sworn officer and 8 civilian personnel.
• The vast majority of these departments (97%) participate in a 911 emergency
telephone system located at the local police department.
• Three-fourths of these 911 systems are enhanced, capable of pinpointing the
location of a caller automatically.
• 42% of these departments operate a temporary holding (lockup) facility for
detention overnight. (Lockups are different from jails).
• 54% of these departments have animal control services.
• 90% of these departments have adopted community policing.
• 88% of these departments have an average of 13 full-time community policing
officers.
• 67% of these departments have an average of 2 School Resources Officers
(SRO).
Looking at these national data, it is readily apparent that the LPD is way below
any national practices in terms of the average number of employees (Sworn Officers and
Civilian), the number of community police officers, and community policing. In a
similar vein, the Committee's direct assessment discussed below clearly shows that
25 Matthew J.Hickman and Brian A.Reaves,Local Police Departments 1999.Washington,D.C.: Bureau
of Justice Statistics,May 2001,NCJ 186478.
29
cutting the LPD force had devastating effects. Today, there are fewer police covering the
Town, there is less effort at enforcing the traffic. On top of that, there has been a notable
lack of support from Town management and Town leadership.
In the light of this discussion, LPD staffing levels before the failed Override
should be considered baseline. At a minimum, funding at the 2002 levels (for both police
and fire) should not be subjected to overrides. However, in the Committee's considered
opinion, nothing would be worse than codifying the 2002 staffing levels for police and
fire. This Report is designed to provide interim answers to a public safety crisis caused
by the failed 2003 Override. It should serve for the short term only, until the
recommended professional studies are conducted.
What makes a good Police Department?
The work of a good police department is defined by the excellence of its services
to the public and the quality of the work life for its members. Applying sound
administrative practices and using modern scientific techniques, a good department will
promote professionalism among its members (Guyot, 1991, op. cit. footnote #45).
Leadership
The Committee looked at leadership issues affecting the LPD morale. After the
failed Override, two senior police officers chose early retirement. While the Committee
has no knowledge of their reasons for leaving, it notes that the loss of experience and
leadership has had a detrimental impact on the Department. Also, the loss is indicative of
things "not being quite right" in the Department. LPD questionnaire results (discussed in
detail in the final segment of this Section) were critical of management. While a certain
degree of criticism of management is present and expected in any organization, the
degree of dissatisfaction exceeded these norms. Lack of advocacy was the leading
complaint. Unlike other Town programs which have exceptionally well organized,
erudite, and decidedly vocal advocacy groups, police and fire do not have any such
external support.26 As discussed in detail below, police and firefighters felt they were not
adequately represented in the 2003/2004 budget discussions. The prevailing concept
relayed in the questionnaires was that they had been"held hostage" in order to force
voters into accepting the 2003 Override. The respondents clearly feel they had been let
down by the Town Manager, the Board of Selectmen, and their Department's
management. This issue is, without a doubt, the single most important factor in the
Police Department's low morale. In general, the perception of lack of representation and
leadership can have profound impact on a police department. It is also a leading cause of
stress.
26 This observation does not mean that both Departments did not try to inform the public of their work or
needs. The LFD,in particular,has disseminated lots of information through the years to little avail.
30
How to measure Police Effectiveness?
Historically, the quality of police performance has been measured by compiling
and tabulating statistics, such as crime in the community, arrests, cases cleared by arrest,
criminal summons, traffic and parking tickets issued, fines generated, residential and
commercial alarms, accident rates, and percentage of stolen property recovered, etc.27 In
particular, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) are
looked at as a key measure of the effectiveness of a police agency.`' Lexington's public
discussions and reports before and after the 2003 Override followed the same assessment
pattern. Unfortunately, UCR and related statistics are reactive measures. As previously
discussed(Section I, 6), such data not only fail to recognize the complexity of policing
but, more importantly, they fail to recognize the monumental changes that have occurred
in policing during the past twenty years. The UCR and related statistics seek to measure
police effectiveness after the fact. By contrast, the objective of modern law enforcement
is the prevention of crime. Today, good police departments are proactive. They are more
concerned with protecting citizens from harm than with tallying up some measures of
arrests after victimization has occurred. As early as 1950, O.W. Wilson (considered by
many to be the father of modern policing) stated that the primary purpose of police is to
serve the citizen: "The police do this by preserving the peace and protecting life and
property against attacks by criminal and from injury by the careless and inadvertent
offender."28 Therefore, the best measure of police department efficiency is the absence of
crime and citizens'perceptions that their persons and property are safe.
Staffing Patterns of the Lexington Police Department
Historically, LPD staffing had been fairly consistent since the 1960s, with staff
ranging from 52 to 54 persons. While police staffing remained relatively steady,
Lexington's population increased. Its complexion changed from rural to suburban.
Population density increased. The LPD polices 16.64 square miles, 153.39 miles of
public roads, and protects the community 24/7, 365 days per year. Over the years, calls
to police have increased. In 2003, police responded to 13,976 calls for service.29 Most
frequent service calls involved building and person checks, almost 2,000 medical assists,
responding to residential and commercial alarms, and motor vehicle accidents. Police
also responded to crimes ranging from arson to burglary to larceny. They enforced
protective orders, made arrests, issued summons, detained arrestees, issued motor vehicle
citations and participated in court cases.
The LPD work day is broken down into shifts: A-shift runs from midnight to
08:00 a.m., B-shift runs from 08:00 to 16:00 p.m., and C-shift runs from 16:00 to
midnight. B-shift usually is characterized by a high number of incident reports,traffic
and other calls. C-shift also has a high number of traffic and incident calls. The late
night A-shift usually has a lower call volume, with staff conducting building inspections
27 Edward A. Thibault,Lawrence M.Lynch,R.Bruce McBride. 1990.Proactive Police Management.
Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice Hall.
28 O.W. Wilson. 1950.Police Administration.New York: McGraw-Hill.
29 2003 Police Department Town Report(Sgt.Joseph O'Leary,Draft).
31
and dealing with drunk driving incidents (DWI). Before the 2003 Override, the LPD
divided the Town into four quadrants and patrol sectors. Four patrol cars covered their
respective quadrant, with a 5th patrol car providing backup as needed. In addition to the
police patrols, the Department had a day time Detective Bureau which included one
general detective, School Resource Officers (SRO) for the Lexington High School, the
Middle School, and the Minuteman Technical School, and a Family Services Detective.
There was also a Drug Task Force Detective, three administrative assistants for handling
records, budgeting, billing, firearms licensing, data entry, etc. There was a Center
Officer who covered the Town's Center Mondays through Fridays, and evenings. The
Department also had an evening detective and one desk officer per shift, as well as a
mechanic, a Parking Enforcement Officer, and a Cadet program.3°
Investigating the effects of the 2003 failed Override on the LPD staffing proved to
be one of the more vexing activities for the Committee. In effect, the LPD lost 15 Sworn
Police Officers. Twelve Patrol Officers were laid off. Three officers left for other
reasons: one was reassigned to the School Department, two transferred to the
Framingham, MA Police Department. As previously discussed, one Dispatcher was lost,
as was the Cadet Program (consisting of five part-time persons). Responding to the cuts,
the Department chose to eliminate Overtime (except for emergencies). Town patrol
coverage was reduced from four cruisers to three. The savings accrued due to these
measures were used by the Department to retain three police officers on an unofficial
basis. Detectives and two SRO officers were reassigned to patrol. The Center Officer
was cut. All five Desk Officers were cut. The traffic clerk was cut.
To clarify the LPD staffing issue, three charts are presented. Chart 10 shows
three columns depicting Police Department Staffing Changes: (1) 2002 - 2003 pre-
budget cut staffing, (2) 2003 —2004 post budget cut staffing, and(3) restored staffing due
to the successful June 2nd 2004 Override. In essence, Lexington's total full-time Sworn
Officers went from a high of 53 in 2002/3 to a low of 41 after the failed Override. With
the 2005 budget restorations and rehiring, full-time Sworn Officers will increase to a total
of 47. One of these forty-seven positions is currently occupied by two half-time Sworn
Officers. Looking at the number of full-time Patrol Officers, Lexington went from a total
of 32 to 26 after the failed Override. After the budget restoration and rehiring, the
number of full time Patrol Officers will increased by one position to 27. This means that
the LPD will continue to have five fewer patrol officers than it had in 2002.
Looking at Command Staff, Chart 10 also shows the loss of one Lieutenant (who
took early retirement) and four Detectives due to the failed Override. FY 2005 budget
restorations and rehiring will reconstitute the Command Staff to the status quo ante. The
budget restoration reinstated part of the cadet program. Three cadets will be added
(compared with 5 in 2002, and none in 2003). Apparently there are no plans to restore
the Traffic Clerk.
Chart 11, Pre-and Post Failed Override, Police and Fire Staffing Levels
further elaborates LPD staffing changes. (Lexington Fire Department manpower and
30 LPD Staffing Allocation and Deployment,undated, acquired February 4,2004.
32
equipment changes are discussed in Section VI of this report). This Chart reflects that
for the duration of the Committee's work, Combined Dispatch, LPD, and the LFD were
moving targets.31 This means that while the Committee's work went on, the Town,
recognizing the harsh effects of the failed 2003 Override, was reviewing the 2004 budget
and preparing the 2005 budget. Over half a million dollars were "found" and some
existing programs, such as Lexpress, received additional 2004 funds. Having already
identified serious public safety needs, the Committee worked at a fever pitch to provide
some input for the deliberations. On Chart 11,the category titled "Projected Post
Summit,"reflects the planned addition of six police officers. The category titled
"Projected with Override," adds one dispatch position and restores 3 cadets. Of special
interest is the last category titled "not requested,"which includes the 5 desk officer
positions, 1 Middle School Resource Officer, 1 traffic clerk and 2 cadets. Thus, Chart
11 graphically reflects Police Department staffing positions that were not restored.
To further clarify staffing changes over time, Chart 12, depicts 2002-2003 LPD
staff before the budget cuts, 2003-2004 staff after the budget cut, and Fiscal Year 2005
staff restorations. The Chart is particularly helpful in depicting LPD positions that are
currently being restored and the positions that remain cut.
Desk Officers
The final staffing issue to be discussed is the police desk officer position. This
position (consisting of 5 sworn officers) was abolished by the failed Override. Desk
officers were literally the first police officer a citizen would see when coming to the
Police Station. They were also the "hub" of the Police Department. Desk Officers man
computer consoles, interact with the public, control the doors, take telephone calls, back
up Dispatch, and serve as the message center and backbone for departmental and ongoing
patrol activities. They communicate with patrols and cruisers. They know and relay what
is going on in a particular shift. They know if an arrestee is being transported to the
Station. They serve as the Booking Officers. This means that desk officers "book",
fingerprint, and photograph arrestees. They check out prior criminal records. Desk
officers are responsible for all detainees at the Station. As required by law, they perform
periodic physical checks of detainees. However, "just glancing" at the closed circuit
television screen of the cells (as currently happens with the lone nightshift Dispatcher) is
insufficient and opens the Department and Town to serious liability issues. Persons
deemed suicidal, must be checked every 15 minutes.`'1 Desk officers also take reports
phoned into the Station. They accept"walk-in"reports from citizens. The latter may
include accidents reports (including hit-and-run), missing person reports, lost and found
property, etc. They process and fingerprint applicants for firearms licenses,job
applications calling for fingerprints, etc. In extreme emergencies, desk officers can drive
a cruiser the scene of the emergency. As such, they give the Department a much needed
edge of flexibility whenever backups are required.
31 While this is typical of most"operations research,"the ever changing picture did not make things any
easier for the Committee.
33
As discussed in the Section IV, the abolition of the desk officer has seriously and
detrimentally affected Dispatch. For example, the sole Dispatcher may be on the
telephone handling a cardio-pulmonary resuscitation or fire call. He/she cannot leave
that telephone for the duration. Who could handle another telephone call, which could
easily be another emergency? What if a citizen, experiencing an emergency, comes to
the police station? Last, not least, the desk officer provides a necessary flexibility for
handling emergencies.
Nationally, the position of the desk officer position is not ubiquitous. Nor are
desk officers required to be Sworn Police Officers. In some departments, desk officers
cover busy shifts only. Others have civilians serving in that function.`'" But there are
considerable advantages to having Sworn Officers in that position. Unlike civilians,they
know the profession. They know the legal limitations of what police can and cannot do.
They can communicate more readily and quickly with fellow officers in the field.
Therefore, the restoration of the Desk Officer would be highly desirable. In fact, in the
absence of 2-2-2 Dispatch staffing, the Desk officer is indispensable. Finally, civilians
cannot fingerprint arrestees, nor can they serve as emergency patrol backups.
Mutual Aid
Section VI of this Report on the Lexington Fire Department discusses the subject
of mutual aid. It notes that the Town has mutual aid agreements with neighbor
communities for purposes of fire protection and medical emergencies. However, mutual
aid is generally not practiced in policing with rare exceptions, such as the hot pursuit of
very dangerous fleeing felons. The reasons for the absence of mutual aid in policing are
found in the organization of police and in their roles and missions. Among these are
distinct jurisdictional boundaries, differences in departmental philosophies and training,
and much diversity in public expectations and clientele. Last, not least, there could be
serious issues of liability.
The remainder of this Section discusses the following topics: (1) the lack of
public awareness of police work and its effects of the LPD; (2) the practical effects of the
LPD downsizing; and (3) the analysis of LPD responses to the questionnaire distributed
to the LPD.
Lack of Public Awareness
As previously discussed (Section I.1.),the Committee was troubled by the almost
total lack of awareness of what police work entails. Yet the absence of knowledge has
not kept a good many persons from suggesting at various times that police positions be
freely traded for increases in public expenditures for other purposes, be that the library,
Lexpress, or other programs.'" Having attended several public meetings during which
Lexington's budget was discussed, the Chair is left with the distinct impression that for
some individuals, both the LPD and the LFD are nothing more than a"shopping basket,"
where items can be traded at will. Yet the Chair has never observed a single instance in
which members of the LPD and Fire Departments reciprocated in kind. Misinformation
34
was also kept afloat. At the February 25th 2004 Summit Budget meeting, a direct
participant rhetorically suggested that the FY 2005 budget had fully restored public safety
funding to the status quo ante of the failed 2003 Override. Moreover, it was suggested
that this action would result in severe cuts in other vital Lexington programs. Most
members of the Public Safety Staffing Committee were not only present at the Summit
but, had they been called upon, would have easily been able to set the record straight.
These comments are not designed to stifle any public discussions of program needs or the
exploration of alternative ways for providing services. To the contrary, what Lexington
needs is more public discussions and more involvement of citizens in Town activities
than is presently the case. However, what is recommended here is that any public safety
suggestions consider the full consequences of whatever is being proposed.'X
Practical effects of the 2004 LPD Budget Cuts
• Increased workload and reduction of services.
The LPD staff reductions discussed above severely impacted the work
load of those who remained. The four-sector patrol was reduced to three.
Only five persons covered a shift (due to vacations, sick leave, earned time
off, etc.). The Center Officer was cut and reassignments deprived the
schools of their SROs, and the Town of the Family and Narcotics Officers.
However, none of these cuts was accompanied by any decline in family
violence and the need to enforce protective orders. The substance abuse
problems appear to have increased.32
• Loss of Community Policing
Reacting the only way it could, the Department returned to a reactive
mode of policing. Community policing was all but eliminated.
Community outreach programs, such as National Night Out, Police
Officers attending community meetings, station tours, school visits, etc.,
had never been widely utilized by the LPD. While the Department has
been able to maintain a minimal presence at Lexington's annual Discovery
Day, it has done so by using volunteers or granting time off for
participating. Bicycle Patrol, begun in 1992 in response to the growing
number of persons using the Minuteman Bikeway, is all but eliminated
today. When in operation, the Bike patrol not only covered the
approximately 5 miles of the Minuteman Bikeway in Town but also
patrolled recreation areas, school and community functions in and around
Lexington. In the recent past, the bikes have only been used on Patriot's
Day and the recent Reenactment held for the Democratic National
Convention. The failed Override eliminated the Child Safety Car Seat
Program. LPD participation in NEMLEC (17 member communities
regional response team using shared resources in specific areas of
expertise, i.e. SWAT, Motorcycle, Computer Crimes, etc.) has been
reduced to only two officers from the required 10% participation of the
32 See, for example,a direct quote from LHS Substance Abuse Prevention Social Workers Julie Fenn and
Beth Mintz,Lexington Minuteman,February 19,2004.
35
Department's Sworn Officers. This is but one example of Lexington not
living up to its interagency agreements. (Fire and medical emergency
services are discussed in Section VII, of this Report).
The sum total of these actions has put Lexington into a regressive mode of
law enforcement to a point where policing used to be in the 1980s. This
puts the LPD out of line with national police trends. It also means that the
LPD cannot focus on the problems of thriving white collar crime,
mushrooming identity and computer theft, fast-traveling burglary rings
and related"hit and run" criminals. Pursuing these types of crimes, calls
for time-consuming tracking and extended surveillance. In short, the
2003/2004 manpower reductions effectively cut the Department's ability
to perform these duties and have thereby placed all of us at risk. More
importantly, the focus on crime prevention has been lost. In line with the
previous discussion,prevention is best in police work. Intervention is
good, while reacting to a crime that has already occurred, represents the
worst possible option.
• Reduction in the Quantity and Quality of Services
Budget cuts have led to prioritizing the way the LPD responds to calls for
service. Rapidity of dispatch and public assistance decreased for many
calls upon triage. Differential responses are harsh on any victim who
expects to see a police officer and does not get one. Police must be
adequately staffed to facilitate quality service in all matters, criminal and
non-criminal. If police are overwhelmed as they were after the failed
2003 Override, they hurry from one incident to the next. They are more
apt to react by protecting themselves from unreasonable workloads. For
example, they may cut their initiation of assistance and give short shrift to
low priority calls. As previously noted, detainees are currently supervised
at time by the 911 Dispatchers only. Secretaries should not fingerprint
anyone. Even with the 2004 budget restoration of six positions, the
Department is still six positions short from where it was in 2002/2003. In
short, unlike recent public statements by Town management regarding the
delivery of services, the LPD cannot deliver the same level of services it
did prior to the failed Override. It must do less with less. In short, the
budget cuts resulted in the loss of elasticity of the Department. In
particular, the loss of assignment flexibility raises the specter of serious
safety problems, especially if extraordinary emergencies were to occur.
• Increased Risk to Officer safety
Single officer responses to vehicular accidents and burglar alarms can
expose police to serious dangers. There is a high accident rate around the
Lexington portions of Route 2 and Route 128. Lone Patrol Officers, when
encountering armed persons, are at grave risk of harm.
36
• Increased Public Safety Risks Due to Tangible Changes in Policing
Practices, and the Loss of Deterrence
Prior to the failed Override, Lexington enjoyed a genuine reputation as a
well policed and safe society. Criminals avoided driving through Town
knowing that driving infractions or vehicles in disrepair would draw law
enforcement attention. Post-override reductions appear to have changed
these perceptions, while driving infractions appear to have increased.33
While the number of accidents in and around the Town Center appears to
have remained relatively stable before and after the failed Override, there
is a clear need for a police presence in the Center. In other words, police
should be visible in the Center to identify violators and to deter
offenders.34 To shed light on failed Override law enforcement changes, the
Committee collected LPD data on the subject. Chart 13, Change in
Citation and Traffic Enforcement Attributable to the Failed Override
demonstrates just how much change has occurred. Chart 13, compares
the total number of warnings, civil citations, criminal citations and arrests
over a six months period (July through December) in 2002, with a six
months period (July through December) in 2003. The reductions in law
enforcement actions are dramatic. Warnings decreased by 62.5%, civil
citations decreased by 53.7%, arrests decreased by 14.6%, and criminal
citations decreased by 41.6%. Combined, citations and traffic
enforcement, attributable to the failed Override, decreased by a striking
55.7%. It is also clear that crime (however it is counted), driving
infractions and other law enforcement problems did not decrease during
the same time period. It is axiomatic in social science research that
perception is as important as reality. The only persons who benefited
from such a dramatic reduction in law enforcement in Lexington were the
criminals and the scofflaws. Police presence (whether in the Town Center
or on the streets), unquestionably deters crimes and traffic infractions.
The mere visibility of a cruiser and officer also reassures the public and
reduces the likelihood of robberies. The failed Override reduced police
coverage in the Town to such a degree that public safety was threatened.
The current partial restoration of coverage is still not adequate to get the
job done.
• Loss of Cadets
The 2003 failed Override eliminated the Department's Cadet Program.
Cadets cost approximately $30,000 per person, while Sworn Officers
roughly call for the expenditure of$51,000 to $52,000 per year per person.
Cadets are best viewed as police apprentices. They can perform detainee
cell checks, data entry, take messages, and run errands. However, cadets
have no power to arrest and cannot triage calls for service, etc. Cadets are
33 Source: LPD Patrol Officer Michael Barry,Committee member.
34 Source:Lt.Mark Corr,LPD.
37
helpful in the Department. Their youthful enthusiasm adds to the quality
of the work environment. But cadets cannot replace the role and function
of a Sworn Officer. They are learning the police profession and should
therefore never be looked upon the same as a bona fide police officer.
Neither should cadets be viewed as cheap labor. FY2005 restoration of 3
Cadets does little to change the staffing equation. It is also understood
that the hours Cadets work were purposively reduced to avoid be need of
paying applicable benefits.
• Additional LPD Service cuts.
The failed Override resulted in the following service cuts:35 there is no
response to minor vandalism. Minor larcenies are no longer investigated,
only reported. There is no police response to scams. There is much less
emphasis on traffic offenses. In particular, Massachusetts laws prohibit
juveniles with learner's permits to drive with other teens in their vehicles.
There is now the perception that the LPD cannot enforce this law because
of manpower shortages. The issue sometimes boils down to the question
of whether officers should concentrate on more serious driving infractions,
such as drunken driving or whether they should enforce teen driving
violations. Police responses are now based on"crime solvability." This
means that police will act if they think that they will be able to identify the
perpetrator of a crime. If that probability is low, they are unlikely to
invest their scarce resources. Citizens who lock themselves out of their
cars are on their own.
• Parking Enforcement
Lexington(pre- and post-Override) has one Parking Enforcement Officer
(PEO). This officer generates considerable income for the Town.
Lexington also had a Traffic Clerk. The clerk's position was cut in 2004
and has not been restored. Currently, there is no designated person to
handle the massive paperwork. Instead, the work is done on the fly by the
PEO and two (already overworked) Departmental secretaries. The result
has been a serious loss of efficiency and income. Under the provisions of
Chapter 90, traffic enforcement fines are returned, in part, to the
Community. This means that those who break the law, help pay for the
repair and maintenance of the roads. A comparative analysis of money
collected over a six months period (7-1-02 to 12-31-02 and 7-1-03 to 12-
31-03) shows a 54.8% decline.36 In terms of dollars, the Town collected
$81,150 during the last six months of 2002. By contrast, the Town
collected only $36,720 over the same time period in 2003. This seems
penny wise and pound foolish. Aware of the need to produce income for
the Town, the Committee suggested at the Summit meeting (during which
35 Source:LPD,including information obtained from the LPD questionnaires.
36 The data were collected and reported on March 16th,2004 by the LPD.
38
2004 budget changes were being discussed) that the position of the traffic
clerk ($24,070) be considered. That position was and is a fiscal win for
the Town.
• Equipment and Technology is Aging and Breaking Down
In March of 2004, the Committee discovered that many officers had
outdated bullet proof vests (as vests age, the material disintegrates and
officers become vulnerable to death and/or injury). At this point, the
police officers have new(or adequate) vests. The Committee also
discovered that many police officers did not have radios and had to share
these as they reported for duty. Radios and communication equipment is
the life blood of police and dispatch. Today, the radio issue has improved.
However, eight more radios are presently needed. Police cruisers (used
24/2, 365 days a year) experience much wear and tear. Unlike previous
practice, when old cruisers would be traded in for new ones, current Town
practices hand over older cruisers to other Department heads. This
permits further deterioration of the vehicles. As will be seen in some
detail in the next segment of this Section, the situation is bad enough that
Patrol Officers find themselves in the position of citing drivers for faulty
cars, while their own cruisers may have the same visible deficiencies.
Departmental computers and cruiser laptops are aging and breaking
down. Laptops are essential to modern policing. Used 24/7, 365 days a
year, they need regularly scheduled maintenance. They should also
periodically be replaced. Laptop failures results in less time in the field
and officers spending more time in the station writing reports. When
broken, officers must turn to Dispatch for vehicular and driver checks.
This, in turn, adds more work to an already overloaded Dispatch.
The Committee had neither time nor the expertise to explore issues of new
hardware and software. But it strongly recommends that these issues be
addressed in the very near future.37 In addition, rather than acquire
separate systems for police and fire which may well happen ifregionalized
fire protection is pursued, all LPD and LFD communications hardware
and software should have interoperability.'
• Inadequate Levels of Training
As happened with Dispatch, there is currently insufficient training in the
Police Department. Whatever training does occur is limited to what is
mandated by law. Unfortunately, the law only defines minimum training
37 The Advanced Generation of Interoperability for Law Enforcement(AGILE)program was created by the
federal government in 1998. It has four primary components:research and development, evaluation and
pilot programs, standard development, and education/outreach. Contact with this Agency would be a good
start whenever Lexington begins to consider purchasing public safety communications equipment and
software.
39
requirements, not what is advisable in a litigious environment. Following
the failed Override, the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council
reduced the mandatory yearly in-service training by 25%to 3 days! All
other training is either grant specific, reduced, or eliminated. In 2001, the
Department began to add personnel to the Civilian Traffic Unit(Special
Police Officers, Crossing Guards, Dispatchers, and Cadets) who have not
been trained by the Massachusetts Police Academy. The only training
they do receive is what the law requires: cardio-pulmonary resuscitation
and First Responder training. It is important to note that the adequacy of
training is invariably a critical issue in liability litigation. Skimping on
training is an invitation to disaster.
• Problems with the LPD Physical Facility
The housing of the LPD is antiquated and singularly unsuited for its work.
The facility is spread over three floors, cramped, inadequately lighted,
cold in winter, hot in summer, and uninviting. The Committee notes with
sadness that in its presentation to Town Meeting, the Capital Building
Committee did not even list the LPD or LFD. There is no fenced in area
for the protection of cruisers and no sally port for the proper handling of
arrestees. Town capital improvement plans need to seriously concern
themselves with these buildings.
Brief Analysis of the Lexington Police Department Questionnaire
The Committee developed and administered a comprehensive questionnaire for
the LPD (Appendix C). Respondents were guaranteed absolute anonymity. At the time,
the Department had 53 active officers and dispatchers. Of these, 36 questionnaires were
returned, reflecting a 68% return rate. Appendix A presents the compilation of the
responses. The Committee encourages the reader to examine this Appendix to obtain the
full flavor of problems, issues, and respondent perceptions. The following brief analysis
highlights key points made by the respondents.
• Over two-thirds of the respondents thought that the Department was not
very effective in the planning and preparation for the personnel changes
mandated by the failed Override.
• The responses clearly show the Departments shift away from crime
prevention and community policing. Respondents lamented the false
image Town and Department leaders presented to the community that
neither services nor safety had been compromised by the staffing cuts.
Respondents also regretted their inability to intervene or follow up on
domestic violence, medical health crises, troubled youths, and children at
risk.
• Morale was relatively good before the failed Override. After the budget
cuts, morale slumped. Almost 95% rated morale as "low." Several added
another response option noting there was no morale.
40
• Respondents did not blame the voters for their distress. But over 83%
placed the responsibility for low morale on the decisions made by the
Town Manager and Selectmen.
• Over 90% of the respondents blamed management decisions made by the
Department.
• Labor relations and unions do not appear to be a major issue for the LPD.
• Over 86% considered their daily work environment as another important
factor affecting morale.
• Surprisingly, over 58% of the respondents report much satisfaction from
being able to prove service to the public. Many are saddened by the lack
of support from management and the Town. Public safety should not be
turned into a political carrot or stick.
• 86%thought training after the Override was inadequate. Respondents
identified a wide range of training needs. They include emergency
medical training, crime tracking, computers, defensive driving, defensive
tactical training, interviewing, legal and procedural updates, identity theft
and other white collar crime, specialty fields training, legal liability,
firearms and training in less than lethal weapons, and training for the
proper handling of school emergencies. Many deplored the fact that
Lexington used to be, but is no longer a leader in many ways. For
example, training used to include helping the elderly, community policing,
and suicide prevention.
• After the Override, 78% deemed the availability and quality of
equipment as low.
• When asked to rank the importance of the various police department
positions, respondents prioritized needs in the following order: a 4th Patrol
officer on the road, the 8th Dispatcher, a 5th Patrol officer on the road, and
the Traffic Clerk. Interestingly, the Cadet positions received the lowest
priority.
• A full 80.6% deemed support staff as inadequate. Secretaries are running
up and down the stairs to cover their own responsibilities, the traffic
office, front desk, booking room, and licensing. Inadequate support staff
has led to missing paperwork, increased workloads, longer waits for
information, and administrative work by patrol officers.
• Many respondents were concerned about public safety and officer safety.
Some calls should have two officers present. Calls must be stacked. The
Department had lost the ability to handle simultaneous emergencies.
Many tasks are carried out by persons not trained to perform them.
Supervision is lacking. There is burnout. Many could not understand why
they were so "easily dismissed" by the Town.
• 78% of the respondents thought that service levels, after the Override,
were low.
• Before the Override, a full 86% deemed the staffing levels had provided a
safe work environment. After the Override, 97% thought the work
environment was no longer safe. Relying on mutual aid puts everyone at
risk.
41
• Over 97% of the respondents indicated that staffing levels after the
override no longer provided a safe level of protection to the citizens. Two
fatal automobile accidents and a serious accident involving a child were
cites as examples of increased danger to the community caused by budget
cuts. Response delays present risks of injury or death.
• 100% of the respondents did not think that the 2003/2004 budget
discussions reflected the true needs of the LPD. Many lamented the
perceived sham that Lexington is "safe" and that"nothing usually happens
in Lexington."
• 100% of the respondents thought that public safety had not been given the
priority it needed during the budget 2004 budget process. Respondents
recognized that public safety was cut disproportionately compared with
cost. Public Safety is consistently the last Department to be considered.
Many respondents felt unappreciated and discarded.
Stress and Double Shifts38
As previously discussed, Lexington police officers, dispatchers, and firefighters
appear to be undervalued by the public. They are also appear underappreciated by
management and Town leaders. They work in unpleasant environments with difficult
clientele. Many are forced to work long hours, double shifts, and overtime, fuelled by
absenteeism and understaffing. In short, their work is filled with tension, pressure,
overload and stress. LPD, LFD, and Dispatch administrators have struggled to meet the
public mandate, in spite of declining resources. Political leadership, always strapped for
funds, prefers to spend scarce resources on politically more attractive constituencies.
Thus, money goes to education, transportation, culture, community development, and
Town management, while cutback management has been the order of the day, especially
for the Dispatch and the LPD.
In general, policing, firefighting, and dispatching are stressful activities. But the
Committee's research shows that the LPD and Combined Dispatch exhibit a higher
degree of stress than usual. (The Fire Department's working environment and stress are
discussed in Section VI of this Report). There are many sources of stress or stressors.
One particularly strong stressor was the reduction in force executed after the failed
Override. The apparent ease and swiftness with which the Town acted in discharging so
many of their colleagues clearly caused severe stress for those who remained. The events
suggested they were all "expendable." In the literature, uncertainty about the future and
lack of control over one's environment, have consistently been tied to distress and illness
in the general population. Beyond these cataclysmic events, research also shows that
stress stemming from within the organization, is the biggest stressor of a11.39There is the
previously discussed problem with role conflict and public expectations. Beyond these,
the literature identifies leadership, administrators and supervisors as being among some
38 This segment of the discussion reflects Dr.Edith E.Flynn's Monograph on Stress(1990)prepared for
the National Institute of Justice.
39 Yolanda M. Scott.2004."Stress among Rural and Small-Town Patrol Officers."Police Quarterly,V7,
N2(June).
42
of the most highly stressful aspects of the police job.40Next, the literature lists perceived
inequities in the police environment regarding the allocation of assignments, promotions
and rewards as major stressors.41 In Lexington, the combination of lack of resources,
antiquated equipment, understaffing, increased workloads, and lack of training
opportunities have all added to the stress perceived by staff. Also, the way in which
leaders balance officers' concerns with external environment demands, affects stress.
Leadership varies by the administrator's management style, political skills, and
connections to the community. Small Towns are notorious for pressuring the police
organization.42 Why should Lexington be an exception in this regard? Given the high
stress levels readily apparent in the questionnaires, the Committee strongly recommends
that serious efforts be expended on team building, managerial skills and leadership
training.
Shift work is an important characteristic of public safety work, along with
hospitals, public transport, and power services. Most(not all) have adopted a variant of
the three-shift system, providing organizational coverage 24/7. While shift work has
been practiced for over one hundred years, the difficulties experienced by shift workers
have only recently begun to be addressed by research on man's natural, biologically
based sleep and wake cycles. The latter, found in all living organisms, are called
circadian rhythms (from Latin, circa means about, dies means a day), and denote a cycle
of 24 hours. Through the centuries, human life has evolved environmentally, socially,
and biologically around one solar day. It has also developed into a normal social rhythm
in which daytime is usually devoted to work, evening to leisure activities, and night is
reserved for sleep. Chronobiology is the study of biological rhythms and concerns itself
with the problems incurred with living differently from the norm, in particular working at
night, on (night) shifts, and pulling double shifts or longer. Individual health and
wellness requires homeostasis or a constant (steady) state of many physiological
variables, such as blood pressure, pulse and temperature. Homeostasis is a simplification
of these variables, which are not constant but reflections of rhythmic variations (even
though the latter are within very narrow limits). These cyclical biological variables or
circadian rhythms are responsible for daily changes in the body temperatures, in the heart
rate and blood pressure, and in urinary excretions and hormone production. Circadian
rhythms are affected by such factors as daylight, nightfall, eating and sleeping patterns.
An individual's endogenous (or body) clock adjusts continuously to the exogenous
(outside) reality of society's work-life schedule. This process if called synchronization
or entrainment. Most persons are not aware of this process, except when they encounter
the disruptive effects of jet-lag. Research shows that trans-meridian flights exert an acute
effect on circadian rhythms comparable to the impairment of a 0.05% blood-alcohol level
in the body.
40 L.W.Brooks and N.L.Piquero. 1998/"Police stress: Does size matter?"Policing: An International
Journal of Police Strategies and Management.N21. See also: J.M.Violanti and F.Aron. 1994.
"Ranking police stressors."Psychological Reports.V75,N2(October).
41 Hans Toch.2002 Stress in Policing. Washington,DC.:American Psychological Association.
42 L. Gaines,M. Southerland, and J.Angell.2003.Police Administration.(2nd edition).New York:
McGraw-Hill.
43
The same conflict between body-time and work-time experienced by persons
traversing time zones during air-travel, is felt by shift workers, especially those who man
shifts that rotate between day, evening, and night, and those who pull back-to-back
(double) shifts. Chronobiological research shows that daily alertness rises and falls,
following the pattern of circadian rhythms. Thus, alertness falls between 2 and 7 a.m.,
rises from 8 a.m. to noon, dips between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m., and rises again until about 10
p.m. Conversely, the pressure to sleep is most acute during the early morning hours.
Times of greatest sleepiness are referred to as "zones of vulnerability" and will occur
whether or not a person has had an opportunity to sleep. Most persons cope with the
afternoon"slump." But coping with sleepiness during the predawn hours is a different
matter. Studies examining medical and performance catastrophes found that people
suffer more heart attacks in the early morning hours (most often just after waking) than at
any other time of the day.43 Traffic accidents tend to occur during day-time hours, when
traffic is heavy. However, single-vehicle accidents (including trucks) are highest
between one and four in the morning, suggesting sleep impaired performance. More than
60% of accidents in nuclear plants have occurred during the night shifts. In particular,
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl happened at night. So did the chemical plant explosion
in Bhopal, India. At this point, we know that sleep deprivation and night work are tied to
lowered performance, accident proneness, and other calamities of human error. Sleep
deprivation is also tied to illness and disrupted social and family life.44
Individuals vary in their need for sleep. Many cope with what is essentially an
"unnatural"way of life. It is estimated that about 10% of all workers prefer night work,
while the remainder simply tolerate it. Shift work is a necessity of modern life. While
shift work is unavoidable, steady shifts, clockwise rotation of shifts, and a reduction of
the rate of rotation can help.45 Given the physiological impact of shifts, it is axiomatic
that working double shifts, especially when they occur on a frequent basis as they do for
Lexington's Dispatch, Police, and Fire Department, are not only hazardous to the
individual worker's health but also hazards for public safety. While some persons may
prefer such a schedule for personal reasons, it is not good policy from a public protection
perspective. As previously discussed, Lexington should have adequate Dispatch staffing
as recommended by the Gants report in 1992 and this Committee.
43 Lahey Clinic Health Newsletter(Spring 1989),Boston,MA.
44 J.Rutenfranz,M.Haider,and M.Koller. 1985."Occupational Health Measures for Night-workers and
Shiftworkers,"in S.Folkard and T.Monk.Hours of Work.New York: John Wiley and Sons.
45 Dorothy Guyot. 1991.Policing as though People Matter.Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
44
VI. LEXINGTON FIRE DEPARTMENT
Introduction
The Lexington Fire Department (LFD) is a full-time, professionally staffed fire
department.46 It serves a population of 30,355 living in a fairly dense suburban setting.
Lexington has some light industry, professional buildings, and high-technology
laboratories. Over the past few years, Lexington's population has grown. It has become
more diverse. The elderly are the fastest growing segment in the population. As befits a
healthy community, Lexington is in the process of expanding its housing stock(including
affordable housing) and will add a bio-hazard laboratory as previously discussed. The
newly remodeled Route 128 Rest Stop has added to the LPD and LFD burdens. The site
has a compressed natural gas tank and accommodates trucks carrying hazardous materials
and other dangerous cargo (as it always has since it opened).
Since 1941, the LFD provides Emergency Medical Services (EMS), using a
"tiered response system." The latter consists of two rescue ambulances staffed with
firefighters and emergency medical technicians (EMT) and Paramedics (EMT-P) capable
of providing all modern levels of emergency care and transportation.47 The EMS
equipment consists of a primary rescue/ambulance, staffed 24/7, supported by a
rescue/ambulance cross-staffed with additional on-duty personnel.
Lexington's Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) have different levels of
training: Basic Life Support training (BLS), and Advanced Life Support (ALS), also
known as paramedic training.' As of February 28th, 2004, three of four LFD shifts
provided paramedic coverage. Currently, every shift has at least 2 paramedics. All new
hires will be fully trained paramedics. There are plans to have all firefighter EMTs fully
trained at the paramedic level. ALS provides electrocardiogram analyses; the use of
adjunctive devices to protect the airways of unconscious persons; inserts and maintains
intravenous lines (IVs); administers physician approved solutions and medications,
among other advanced procedures. Medical emergencies requiring ALS include cardiac
disorders, cerebrovascular disease (e.g. stroke), diabetic shock, seizures, severe burns,
trauma from falls or motor vehicle accidents, and maternity complications.
Previous sections of this Report(IV and V) discussed the importance of a speedy
and adequately staffed emergency response system consisting of Dispatch, Police and the
LFD. As noted, seconds count and literally make the difference between life and death.
For example, to be effective, treatments to minimize brain damage from acute stroke
have to begin very soon after stroke onset. Just as important as a quick response, is the
need for a seamless interface between these agencies. Together, speed of response and
agency interface stand for a"chain of survival" for any resident requiring emergency
services.48 Historically, the LFD emergency response times ranged between two and four
minutes. As discussed below in the section titled"Practical Effects of the 2004 LFD
46 Unlike departments staffed by volunteers or by"call men."
47 Source:Lexington Fire Department,April,2004.
48 Source:LFD.Department Overview, 1/7/04,page 3.
45
Budget Cuts,"response times increased significantly after the failed 2003 Override, to the
detriment of the affected residents.
The LFD has the capacity to conduct emergency rescues involving motor vehicle
accidents and persons trapped in confined spaces. Currently, one engine company carries
hydraulic cutting and spreading tools and related equipment.49 The ladder truck is
equipped to provide emergency lighting and ventilation. Even though Lexington is
intersected by Routes 2 and 128, carrying extremely heavy commercial and private
vehicle traffic, the LFD has only limited mitigation equipment and training for the
handling of hazardous environmental and/or man-made materials. As such, the
Department primarily provides scene control and data collection. It can, however, call on
the Metro-Fire Hazardous Material Team, the Hanscom Air Force Base Fire Department,
and neighbor communities for assistance. For example, on August 23rd, 2004, the Avalon
Company received a package through the U.S. mail, containing a"powdery" substance
and called Dispatch.50 Both, the LPD and LFD responded. The LFD sent Engine 4,
Ladder 1, Rescue Ambulance 1, and the Captain's vehicle. Given the reality of today's
terrorist threat, Lexington's Fire Chief called for the assistance of the Regional
Hazardous Material Team. Even though the incident was a malevolent hoax, it clearly
demonstrates the need for a fully staffed and equipped Fire Department. Bio-hazardous
emergency calls are time consuming. A recent accident on Route 128, involved a truck
carrying bio-hazardous materials including radiological waste. This incident illustrated
not only the seriousness of the issue of adequate emergency responses but also
demonstrated the complexity of such accidents. In that case, a number of federal, state,
and local agencies responded, including Hanscom Air Force Base, which provided badly
needed foam to suppress what could easily have turned into a larger problem.51
Next to the fire suppression, fire fighting, and emergency medical responses, the
LFD performs many other functions. It ensures compliance with the Commonwealth's
Code of Massachusetts Regulations and General Laws. It is responsible for fire safety
inspections. There are 56 facilities requiring inspections four times a year. They include
public and private schools, licensed day care facilities, nursing homes, intermediate care
facilities, hotels, motels and theaters. Inspections must be completed. If they are
interrupted by emergency responses, they become even more time consuming. By law,
the LFD must inspect residences put up for sale and newly constructed(commercial and
residential) properties before anyone can move in. Fire protection and detection systems
must be tested. All oil burners must be inspected. The installation and removal of
underground storage tanks,propane and compressed natural gas storage must be
overseen. After installation, wood burning stoves must be inspected. Schools and day
care centers must perform fire drills, which the LFD either attends or accepts affidavits
for. There is also a legal requirement, for insurance purposes, to conduct fire
investigations. All fires must be investigated. The LFD has an ongoing partnership with
the Water Department to test fire hydrant flow for essential water supply for fire
49 Within the very near future, all engine companies will carry hydraulic cutting and spreading tools.
Source:LFD:August 2004.
50 Lexington Minuteman,August 26th,2004.
51 According to the LPD Chief,average hazardous materials calls require four to six hours to address.
46
suppression. Hydrants must be checked for proper marking to assist finding them when
covered by snow.
From July 1st, 2002 to June 30th, 2003, the LFD responded to 3,376 total
emergency calls (fire and EMS).52 There were 1,988 EMS calls for assistance. There
were approximately 1,282 emergency responses from the East Lexington Fire Station
alone. About 1,500 calls involved the transportation of one or more patients to a medical
facility. Most of the transports were made with the primary ambulance. But close to 400
were made by the back-up reserve ambulance. About 200 of these incidents occurred
simultaneously. On average, the transport of patients requires one to two hours,
depending on traffic and road conditions, the hospital, and the capacity of the emergency
room. Each time an ambulance responds to a medical emergency, it is no longer
available for fire duty for the duration of that incident. This means that it cannot be
deployed if a fire or hazardous materials incident occurs. According to existing standards
and guidelines (discussed in detail below), the LFD cannot leave a hazardous or
potentially hazardous situation without first investigating and mitigating the incident.
Examples of such incidents include, but are not limited to the following: (1) An electric
wire is down, either live or not yet confirmed dead by the electric company; (2) Water in
the basement that is flooding a furnace, water heater or other electrical source; (3) A
carbon monoxide detector is activated with (or without) the occupant(s) feeling ill; (4) A
patient is assisted, such as helping a person off the floor; (5) There is an odor inside or
outside of a structure, e.g. wires burning, gasoline, natural gas or propane leaks, etc.
Annually, there are approximately 2.5 million dollars lost in Lexington due to
fire.53 Each new home, business, laboratory, adds new risks. There are approximately
ten fires per week in Town, involving kitchens, stoves, halogen lamps, etc. The Town's
fire alarm system is old. Since not all fire alarm circuits work, voice communication is
necessary for mutual aid requests from Lexington to neighbor communities and Hanscom
Air Force Base, must be relayed by telephone.54
Baseline Levels for Fire/Medical Emeruncv Services and Equipment
Fire Departments (unlike police departments) have national standards to guide
their organizations, equipment, level of services, and training, etc. Nationwide,
municipal governments are mandated to follow these standards under the General Duties
clause of the U.S. Congress's Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act. The
Standards are the product of the Fire Service Leadership Partnership consisting of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Fire
Fighters (IAFF). The National Fire Protection Association(NFPA) administers and
publishes the standards, codes and guidelines. Several existing National Fire Protection
Association standards address minimum staffing requirements for Fire Departments. For
example, NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health
Program states: "while members can be assigned and arrive at the scene of an incident in
52 Source: LFD,February 2004.
53 Source: Chief W.Middlemiss,February 5th,2004.
54 Source: Chief W.Middlemiss,August 31St,2004.
47
many ways, it is strongly recommended that interior firefighting operations not be
conducted without an adequate number of qualified firefighters operating in companies
under the supervision of company officers. It is recommended that a minimum
acceptable fire company staffing level should be four members responding on, or arriving
with, each engine and each ladder company responding to any type of fire."55
Also of relevance to this Report is NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization
and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations,
and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. In effect since
August 2, 2001, discussing national fire standards, the NFPA notes that these standards
are designed to "provide the body politic and the citizens a true picture of the risks in
their community, and the fire department's capabilities to respond to and manage those
risks."56 In turn, the IAFF goes on to note that"...any local government that fails to
follow 1710 is subject to liability claims in the event of fire fighter injuries or deaths."57
The NFPA 1710 provides clear definitions of equipment and staffing: "Fire companies
whose primary functions are to pump and deliver water and perform basic fire fighting at
fires, including search and rescue, shall be known as engine companies. These
companies shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel." Ladder or truck
companies are similarly defined: "Fire companies whose primary functions are to
perform the variety of services associated with truck work, such as forcible entry,
ventilation, search and rescue...shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty
personnel."58
On March 14th, 2003, before the failed 2003 Override, the International
Association of Fire Fighters issued a study titled"Lexington Fire Department Geographic
Information System Fire Suppression Capability Analysis."59 In its conclusion, the report
states:
"This analysis shows the extent of coverage provided by the Lexington Fire
Department with units responding from current station locations. The Lexington
Fire Department has progressively allocated its resources to provide the best
coverage available with those units. The problem remains that current coverage
fails to meet any minimally accepted industry standards. Whether exploring 4-
minute, 8-minute, '2 In/2 Out,' NFPA 1710 Standards Section 5.2.3.2.1, or NFPA
1710 Standard Section 5.2.3.1.1, LFD coverage fails to meet industry standards."
The results show that the Lexington Fire Department is understaffed, and current
staffing levels should be supplemented with additional resources, including the
addition of at least one new station. "
The same IAFF study, upon examining the LFD work volume, also notes that
staffing an Engine or a Ladder with insufficient personnel could lead to a loss of
ss National Fire Protection Association,NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and
Health Program, 1997 Edition.
56 National Fire Protection Association,2002, 1710-1.
57 IAFF Campaign Pamphlet, discussing NFPA Standard 1710.
58 NFPA 1710.2001 Edition,Chapter 5,page 8.
59 IAFF,March 14,2003.
48
efficiency and increased fire losses. Referring to the National Fire Protection Handbook,
IAFF states that"Staffing fire apparatus at a level below minimum requirements can
result in a less effective and less safe fire fighting performance," and that calling for
additional assistance "should not be relied upon to replace adequately the required
staffing and equipment needed immediately at the scene for initial attack and rescue."60
Before the failed Override, the LFD operated out of two strategically located fire
stations. The Headquarters station housed 1 Shift Commander's car, staffed with one
captain, 1 Engine Company, staffed with 1 lieutenant and 2 firefighters, 1 Ladder
Company, staffed with 3 firefighters and 1 Rescue Company (Ambulance), staffed with 2
firefighter paramedics or EMTs. Staffing at the East Lexington Fire Station included one
lieutenant, two firefighters, manning one engine company. Paramedics (or EMTs),
although assigned to an ambulance, must participate in fire fighting operations. If
needed, they operate the second backup hose line. The bottom section of Chart 11
(Section V), depicts NFPA standards and the LFD staffing prior to June 2nd, 2003. The
chart highlights the discrepancies between the national standards and LFD's staffing.
The top section of Chart 14,titled Initial Full Alarm Assignment Capability Deployed
within 8 Minutes also shows the recommended staffing levels and equipment called for
by NFPA Standard 5.2.3.2.2.61
Also before the failed Override, staffing consisted of 54 firefighters. The
Department fielded 4 groups of 13 firefighters. Each group consisted of 1 captain, 2
lieutenants, and nine firefighters under the control of the Fire Chief and Assistant Fire
Chief. While this staffing pattern did not reflect the 15 or 17 firefighters per group
recommended by the Standards, the Department managed to attain the required minimum
of 12 person shifts by paying considerable overtime rather than fill existing vacancies
with new employees. As was the case with the LPD, the Committee identified problems
with the Fire Department that predate the failed 2003 Override. With no 'fat' to be
trimmed, the budget reductions cut to the bone. The East Lexington Fire Station was
closed. The station's personnel were moved to the LFD Headquarters. The
Department's secretary was laid off. Staffing was reduced to a minimum of 8 firefighters
per shift. One engine company was idled, and the shift commander's car was eliminated.
These changes are highlighted on the bottom of Chart 14, 5.2.3.2.2, Initial Full Alarm
Assignment Capability Deployed within 8 Minutes. The Committee notes that these
cuts reduced the manning of the fire apparatus even further than before, below national
standard requirements, and thereby placed public safety and property at risk It also put
fire personnel at risk
In February of 2004, the Firefighter Union and Town, through an `unfair labor
practice' agreement, developed a plan to increase on duty minimum staffing levels, as
funds for overtime and unfilled positions became available. Both, the Town and the
Department conducted incremental reviews of the budget. Gradually, staffing went back
to a minimum staffing of 12. After the successful 2004 Override,the East Lexington Fire
60 National Fire Protection Association. 1998. Fire Department Occupational Health and Safety
Standards Handbook.First Edition, Stephen N.Foley,Editor.
61 The 15 to 17 personnel standard on Chart 14, apply to the use of Aerial Devices and Supply Pumps.
49
Station reopened with a staff of 1 officer and 2 firefighters. Staffing patterns at the LFD
Headquarters returned to the status quo ante of the failed Override. As the bottom part of
Chart 11 shows, there is now a minimum of 12 persons per shift. If there is an absence
due to illness, leave, etc., others get called in. The Committee probed to determine if
there are enough funds to cover 12 persons per shift for 12 months. As best as the
Committee could determine, currently available funding comes "close"to what is needed.
Compared with the full funding the LFD had requested, the Department is approximately
$100,000 to $150,000 short.X1 Full funding would significantly reduce overtime hiring
to maintain the 12 person per shift minimum staffing. There is an understanding that if
money ran out, supplemental funds could be requested. Supplemental funding is clearly
preferable to any reductions in current staff coverage below the minimum of 12 persons
per shift.
Optimum LFD coverage of the Town calls for three persons per fire engine and
truck. The shift commander or Officer in Charge (OIC) should not be involved with the
actual fire fighting operations so that he/she can fully concentrate on the 'big picture' of
the event and make appropriate safety calls. OICs protect not only the firefighters but
also the residents at the conflagration site. The combination of OIC and firefighters help
assure not only safety but also accountability during emergency incidents. Currently, the
LFD cannot handle multiple alarms. In emergencies, the LFD uses a paging system to
bring in additional personnel. However, there are issues of distance, frequencies and
response times to be considered. While the budget restorations were clearly helpful,
increasing compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards is
recommended Finally, given previously discussed housing and laboratory expansions,
Lexington has a need for three fire stations.
What makes a good Fire Department?
As with police, the work of a good fire department is defined by the excellence of
its services to the public and the quality of the work life for its members. Applying sound
administrative practices and using modern scientific techniques, a good department will
promote professionalism among its members (Guyot, 1991, op. cit. footnote #45).
Leadership
Analysis of the responses to the Committee's LFD questionnaires, reflect stress
and strain related to the previous administration. However, the situation changed
dramatically under the leadership of Chief William Middlemiss, who became Chief in
March of 2004. Respondents were enthusiastic about his leadership style, the fact that he
reports back to his Department on a regular basis, attends all necessary public meetings,
restored standard operating procedures for the Department, and proactively represents his
Department's equipment and staffing needs in front of the BOS and Town Management.
50
Fulltime Administrative Assistant and/or Clerk
The failed 2003 Override resulted in cutting the only fulltime Administrative
Assistant from the LFD. As a result, the Station is left empty many times (when all
available staff and equipment respond to fire and/or medical emergencies). Anyone can
wander in and walk about unimpeded. There is no one to answer the telephones and no
one to schedule appointments. People coming to the Station must wait when emergency
calls come in. There is no one to process accounts payable, payroll, or answer payroll
questions. There are delays in obtaining permits. Time spent by the Fire Chief on
clerical work reduces his availability to personnel and his time for decision making.
Critical training time is reduced by having to play catch up with administrative work.
The Committee found it almost inconceivable that in this day and age of all-
embracing bureaucracy, federal and state requirements, mandatory inspections,
mandatory compliance and testing reports and reports, etc., the Fire Chief(and
firefighters) must do the Department's clerical work.Xl' While the Committee was
working on this issue, Town Management mitigated the situation with a secured,
federally funded, half-time intern to work at the LFD from March 15th, 2004 to March
15th, 2005. While helpful, the Committee strongly recommends that the LFD be
supported by a full time administrative assistant and/or clerk. In other words, chiefs do
chiefs' work and clerks should do clerical work. What 3.5 million dollar operation
functions without an administrative assistant or clerk? The Committee thought that the
absence of an administrative assistant/clerk was serious enough to request(at the Town's
Summit Meeting)that money be added to assure that the halftime federal intern would
serve for the full year. Specifically, the Committee asked that the FY 2005 Base Budget
include an additional $7,020 to cover that clerk for 3.5 months until June 30, 2005. (See
Appendix E).
Lack of Public Awareness
As was the case with the LPD, there seems to be an almost total lack of public
awareness and understanding of what appropriate fire-suppression, firefighting and
emergency medical responses entail. The readiness with which some residents wanted
the East Lexington Fire Station closed was, as far as the Committee could ascertain,
without precedent. Fire,police, and emergency protections are not luxuries, they are
necessities of life. Without doubt, taxpayers should have the most economical protective
systems. But as previously discussed, the Fire Departments staff and equipment had
never reached full compliance with existing National standards, whether before or after
the Overrides. There was no overstaffed Fire Department to be reined in. Also, as
previously noted, the Town will need three fire stations, given scheduled expansions of
housing, business, and laboratory stock. It is axiomatic that growth brings increases in
risks.
The lack of public understanding of the role of the LFD had a clear impact on
Department morale. As was the case with the LPD, employment instability is stressful,
especially when people put their lives on the line for the public. LFD's new leadership
51
and the budget restorations had a positive impact on morale. However, Town leadership
recognition of the value and true needs of its Fire Department would have a positive
impact on employee perceptions and boost morale, as no other action could.
Sending Multiple Equipment to a Medical Call: Luxury or Necessity?
The LFD sends a fire engine and an ambulance to every medical emergency call.
Some residents, observing this deployment, interpreted this practice as evidence of
overstaffing and needless redundancy. The Committee investigated the issue and found
the following:
• All emergency calls are triaged by Dispatch which determines, within existing
guidelines, whether an Advanced Life Support or a Basic Life Support response
is required. (See previous discussion of ALS and BLS).
• ALS services (begun April 19th, 2004), require paramedics to carry extensive
equipment, including cardiac monitors and defibrillators, a drug box, oxygen,
and a"first-in-bag" consisting of a large trauma kit. Paramedics must also
return the equipment. Fire engines carry items the ambulance cannot
accommodate.
• At the scene of the emergency, one paramedic communicates with the patient.
The second paramedic obtains vital signs, including blood pressure, cardiac
monitoring, connects 12 leads of the electrocardiogram machine (EKG) to the
patient, and test blood sugar, among other things. The fire company officer
obtains the patient's history from his/her family. Another member of the fire
company brings in the requirement transport appliance, stair chair, or stretcher.
• The presence of the fire company reduces the need for multiple trips to and
from the scene of the emergency, facilitates a uniform flow of patient care, and
enables both vehicles to return quicker to be available for new calls.
• Many patients require more than one person in attendance. Multiple `hands'
facilitate the safe removal of the patient from the site. They also help reduce
work related back injuries of personnel. Many times, impediments (snow,
furniture) need to be removed to facilitate evacuation.
• Cardiac patients and those requiring cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
require one person to administer chest compression, one person to ventilate the
patient, and an additional person to drive the ambulance to the hospital. If
resuscitation is not begun in less than six minutes, there is no hope for survival.
• Severe accidents must be tended to by many persons and equipment, especially
if a"Med-Flight" evacuation is not possible.
52
A final point in this discussion goes to the heart of what should be an appropriate
role for public safety (Dispatch, Police, Fire Department) in a community. Unlike other
public services that may be justifiably "demand driven, " a well functioning public safety
system must be ready for the unexpected. It must be prepared for major incidents (e. g.,
multiple vehicle accidents, serious injuries and death), and the handling of simultaneous
emergencies. Such an event could easily require all the resources Lexington has, and
may need mutual aid as well.
Practical effects of the 2004 LFD Budget Cuts
Closing the East Lexington Fire Station was divisive for the Town, pitting the
residents of one geographic section against another. The action also failed to consider a
number of important issues:
• After the failed Override, calls for assistance were handled by staff and
equipment from LFD's Headquarters. As a result, emergency response
times nearly doubled, depending on the circumstances. For example,
depending on a particular address (for example East Lexington), the
arrival of the fire apparatus was delayed. With the backup ambulance no
longer available, injured residents had to wait longer for ambulance
assistance.' In an analysis of actual response times from July 1, 2003 to
July 21st, 3003, response times increased from a normal average of 2.7
minutes (with a range of 1 to 4 minutes), to an average of 7.5 minutes,
with a range of 4 to 12 minutes).62 As previously discussed, these delays
exceeded national standards and constituted serious risks to the
community.
• Unattended fires double in size within one minute. Just because
Lexington has not had a conflagration as recently occurred in Rhode
Island, does not mean that something similar could not happen here.
• The lack of a second fire engine and inadequate water supply resulted in
an East Lexington home burning to the ground and extensive fire exposure
damage to neighboring houses. (Date of Fire: August 23, 2003).63
• The failed 2003 Override changed the way firefighters responded to
emergencies. In essence, they followed more strictly the existing
standards, in order to assure the life and survival of its personnel. As a
result, the efficiency for fighting fires declined and property losses
increased. For example, houses located adjacent to a fire were at
increased risk of sustaining fire damage because the Department's limited
resources could only focus on the fire site. Obviously, the LFD could no
longer follow the strategy recommended by NFPA 1710: "early,
62 Source:LFD.Fire Department Incident Impact Report,July 1,2003 to July 21,2003.
63 Past and present Fire Chiefs do not think a second engine would have made an impact on the house that
burned down,but the exposure damage to adjacent buildings would have been much less. (LFD: 8/31/04).
53
aggressive, and offensive primary interior attacks on a working fire are
usually the most effective strategy to reduce loss of lives and property
damage."
• The cost savings were, in part, an illusion. When insurance companies
compute their premiums for residential fire coverage, they include a
home's distance to the fire station in their calculations. Any changes that
increase risk will eventually be reflected in the home owner's insurance
premium.
• If the 2003 failed Override cuts had not been redressed by the Town, the
Insurance Services Office Inc.'s rating of the Fire Department would have
increased, raising the Town's and eventually each resident's insurance
rates.64 ISO ratings are based on staffing, response times, age of
equipment, etc. The organization uses a scale of one to six, with 1 being
optimal. Ratings occur every six to ten years. Before the failed Override,
Lexington was given a rating of three, yet another bit of evidence that the
LFD was not the well-off Department some residents thought it to be.
Had the ISO rated the LFD after the failed Override, its ratings would
have increased to four or five.65
• Inspectional services and preventive services were severely reduced, and
some services were cut completely.
Aging Buildings and Equipment
The LFD Headquarters is an old and deteriorating building. Of particular concern
is a continuing leakage from the adjacent Shell Oil Gas Station into the LFD basement.
The Committee observed considerable amounts of mold/fungi around pumps and other
equipment. Located across from that contaminated site is the physical fitness with weight
lifting equipment and treadmills. While there are air filter installed in the ceiling, the
situation is egregious. Mold is a recognized, serious contaminant that endangers the
health and wellbeing of anyone in contact with it. Excellent physical fitness is a job
related requirement for firefighters. No Lexington resident or employee of the Town
should be in danger of exposure to this substance. At the recent Town Meeting, the
Capital Committee, reviewing the Town's capital assets and identifying building
problems, never mentioned the Fire (or Police) Department building. Committee
discussion created the impression that Fire Department personnel appear to have a high
incidence of cancer.66 This issue should be followed up. Given the clear existence of
mold so close to the physical fitness room, the Committee strongly recommends that this
situation be remedied as the earliest possible moment.
64 The Insurance Services Office(ISO),located in New York City,regularly reviews public fire
suppression facilities and develops public protection classifications for fire insurance ratings purposes.
65 Source: Chief William Middlemiss,February 5th,2004.
66 The Committee did not collect any data on this issue.
54
As is the case with Police Cruisers and Equipment, LFD's fire engines, ladder
truck, and ambulances are aging. ISO ratings are based on the quality, age, and condition
of the equipment. As previously discussed, the telecommunications system is outdated.
In light of this finding, the Committee suggests that the previously recommended
professional study (Section I, 6) include a comprehensive analysis of LFD equipment
and communications needs.
Mutual Aid
Mutual aid is a system in which fire departments in a cluster of neighboring
communities agree to respond to medical and fire incidents on an as needed basis.
Mutual aid is coordinated by Metrofire. It covers 34 communities in metropolitan
Boston. Mutual aid is only supposed to be used for bone fide emergency situations, not
for non-emergency duties. In 2003 and 2004, Lexington has received emergency
assistance from Arlington, Bedford, Belmont, Burlington, Hanscom Air Force Base,
Lincoln, Waltham, Winchester, and Woburn. Had there been a major emergency in
Boston due to the recent Democratic National Convention, the LFD would have been
called upon to render assistance.
Before the failed 2003 Override, the LFD provided its share of assistance to
neighbor communities. With the failed Override, the picture changed dramatically.
Chart 15, Mutual Aid into Lexington, FY 03 —FY 04 shows mutual aid received by
Lexington from its neighbors between July 1st 2002, and March 22nd, 2003. During that
timeframe, Lexington received emergency assistance from its neighbors 155 times. By
contrast, between July 1st, 2003 and March 22nd, 2004, Lexington received mutual aid
394 times! Of these, Arlington responded 12 times, Bedford 145 times, Belmont 37
times, Burlington, 36 times, Hanscom Air Force Base, 46 times, Lincoln 23 times,
Waltham 52 times, Winchester 22 times, and Woburn 21 times. In the words of The
Belmont Citizen Herald, "mutual aid is not so mutual."67 Chart 16, Percentage Change
in Mutual Aid into Lexington, FY 03 —FY 04 demonstrates graphically the asymmetry
of mutual aid brought on by the failed Override.
The important issue about mutual aid is that it is based on the principle of quid
pro quo. Neighbor communities may, at some point, refuse to participate in such an
uneven arrangement. For example, Saugus has recently gone on record of not being able
to respond to requests for mutual aid because of scarce resources. Others may follow. In
a recent interview, Belmont Fire Chief William Osterhaus stated pointedly: "I don't know
when Lexington is going to fund the services they need, but they're really abusing the
mutual aid system drastically, both for ambulance and for fire calls."68 The same Belmont
Citizen Herald article quotes Bedford Fire Chief Kevin McCaffrie as saying that
Lexington had put a strain on his department (and others) by reducing his town's
resources. For example, since Bedford has only one ambulance, the town was forced to
call for mutual aid for Bedford because its ambulance was busy responding to
emergencies in Lexington.
67 LFD statistics,August 2004. See also Belmont Citizen Herald. April 26,2004.
68 Ibid.
55
Brief Analysis of the Fire Department Questionnaire
The Committee developed and administered a comprehensive questionnaire for
the LFD (Appendix D). Respondents were guaranteed absolute anonymity. A total of
52 questionnaires were distributed. Of these, 30 questionnaires were returned, reflecting
a 58% return rate. Appendix B presents a compilation of the responses. The Committee
encourages the reader to examine this Appendix to obtain the full flavor of problems,
issues, and respondent perceptions. The following is a brief analysis highlighting key
points made by the respondents.
• Over two-thirds of the respondents indicate that they were not involved in the
planning for the personnel changes before and after the failed Override. (Note:
this was before the new Fire Chief took command).
• 23% of the respondents reported very low morale before the failed Override.
After the failed Override, that number jumped to 93%.
• Factors having the highest impact on LFD morale were the Town Manager
and Selectmen, 70%, Town Meeting and the Voters, 60%, and Department
Management, 60%.
• Respondents thought that the Department's captains and lieutenants are doing
an excellent job in spite of great difficulties.
• Labor relations seem to be on an even keel (as is the case for the LPD).
• Many respondents identified the daily work environment as a major factor
impacting morale. Other factors listed include an unstable work environment,
lack of supplies, the sick building, and a public that does not see the
frustration, disappointment, and poor morale.
• There is a major safety risk when the Fire Station is left unattended and
anyone can walk around (in cases when all personnel are responding to an
emergency).
• A strong majority of firefighter respondents derive their greatest satisfaction
from serving the public.
• Before the failed Override, one third of respondents thought that training was
not adequate. After the failed Override, 87% thought that training was not
adequate. Respondents identified many training needs ranging from mass
casualty incident training, counterterrorism, to continuing education.
• Inadequate technology and lack of equipment quality are serious issues for the
LFD. 54% of the respondents described these issue are "low" and "very low"
before the failed Override. This percentage increased to 83% after the failed
Override. Factors include aging equipment, scores of computer related
problems, malfunctioning communications and dispatch incident management
software, and inadequate training, among many other issues.
• The loss of the administrative assistant brought many problems, ranging from
poor customer service, unanswered telephones,to loss of training time.
• Staff reductions due to the failed Override seriously impacted 97% of the
respondents. Many cited increased risks to the public and to firefighters.
56
Medical assist delays, reduced firefighting efficiency, and changing
firefighting modes were identified and deplored.
• The loss of the East Lexington Fire Station seriously affected 97% of the
respondents. The closing eliminated the backup water supply and made things
more dangerous for the public and the personnel.
• 97% of the respondents were seriously affected by the loss of the 2nd engine
company. Many cited increased safety risks, delayed water supply, and
changes from offensive to defensive tactics as factors.
• A majority of respondents thought that the failed Override seriously affected
their ability to conduct quarterly inspections and reduced their familiarity with
buildings and restaurants.
• There was high agreement on the importance of the Fire Chief, Assistant Fire
Chief and Administrative Assistance.
• Most respondents thought that the Department's level of service was very
high before the failed Override. That percentage changed significantly after
the failed Override. Answers included: "We still give 100%to all, no matter
what," and were worried about greater risks of injury and death to firefighters
as well as about poorer medical outcomes.
• Prior to the failed Override, a majority of respondents (53%)felt that staffing
levels were adequate to provide a safe environment for their work After the
failed Override, 97%felt that was no longer the case. Responses identified a
"constant juggling" of public and firefighter safety, insufficient staffing levels
to meet standards or handle serious incidents, overtaxed equipment, no more
aggressive firefighting...all in the face of increased emergency call volume.
• 100% of the respondents thought that staffing levels after the failed Override
no longer provided citizens with a safe level of protection. Respondents were
concerned about many issues: response delays, insufficient staffing for
providing accepted practice fire suppression, inability to handle multiple calls,
unreasonable waits for out of Town ambulances, prolonged time to reach East
Lexington, running `ragged' to cover the whole Town with just one engine
and one ladder.
• 83% of the respondents think that the 2003/2004 Town budget sessions
neither reflected the true needs of the Department, nor the safety of fire
personnel or the public. Respondents did not want to be used as a"carrot or
bait"to persuade the public to vote for the Override. They also did not think
that public safety should be put on a"bundled" override.
• 83% of the respondents think that public safety was not given the priority it
needed throughout the 2004 budget process. The respondents had great
difficulty understanding that other issues, such as recreation, took priority
over public safety. Lack of public understanding and lack of Town leadership
on public safety needs are issues of concern. The losses due to the Camden
Road fire (August 23, 2003) would not have been as high as they were, if the
East Lexington Fire Station had been open.
• The respondents make many good suggestions on how public safety could be
enhanced in Lexington. They also provide vivid descriptions of the needs of
Dispatch, which parallel the Committee's findings on that subject.
57
Asked to "think outside the box," respondents provide many constructive
suggestions on how work activities and manpower redeployment could be undertaken to
reduce public safety costs. Among these is the observation that slightly increased staffing
(about 55 to 60) would greatly eliminate overtime cost. If the building were repaired, oil
and gas costs could be cut. Fixing the "sick" fire building could reduce future health-
related costs. Improved training, replacing aging fire apparatus, and communications
equipment would raise efficiency and effectiveness.
In closing, the Committee expresses its appreciation to the BOS for providing it
with an opportunity for input into its future deliberations on public safety. It also wishes
to thank Chief Middlemiss and Chief Casey for the use of their facilities for Committee
meetings and untold tangible assistance and information.
58
i O.W.Wilson and Roy C.McLaren. Police Administration.New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972. See also
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,Police.U.S.Government
Printing Office, 1973
11 Linton C.Freeman and Robert F.Winch,"Societal Complexity:An Empirical Test of a Typology of
Societies,"American Journal of Sociology,LXII,(March, 1957).
111 A good discussion of these issues can be found in: Jerome B.McKinney and Lawrence C.Howard.
Public Administration: Balancing Power and Accountability.Oak Park,Illinois: Moore Publishing Co.
1979.
iv Victor H. Sims. Small Town and Rural Police. Springfield IL: Charles C. Thomas,Publishers, 1988;
Dorothy Guyot.Policing As Though People Matter. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.
Criminal Justice Research has identified multiple problems with the Uniform Crime Reports. First,
UCR are collected by individual police departments and reported to the FBI on a voluntary basis. There
are serious differences among department in definitions of crime. The data are also subject to"fudging,"
depending on the political needs of the reporting jurisdictions. For examples,research has documented that
at times mayors and town leaders have deliberately decreased crime rates to show efficient management
and improvements in the quality of life. Further,the UCR report only on seven"Index"crimes:murder
and non-negligent manslaughter,forcible rape,robbery,aggravated assault,burglary,larceny-theft, and
motor vehicle theft. There is limited reporting on arson and hate crimes and no reporting on the nation's
largest criminal activity,white collar crime. For example,there is no reporting on identify theft and
computer crime,two of the fastest growing crime categories in the nation.
Vl As a court certified expert in criminal justice,the Chair has presented evidence in several court cases that
checking every fifteen minutes is too long a time interval to assure the safety of detainees. This is because
suicide can be and has been accomplished in less than seven minutes.
'11 The Chair has studied the issue of Desk/Dispatch officers extensively for the Middlesex County Sheriff s
Department.
Viii Among the latest,no doubt,well intended proposals on the e-mail circuit is for the LPD to adopt a
Comstat system. Comstat refers to a"strategic control system,"designed to collect and disseminate a
jurisdiction's crime problems and to track efforts to deal with them. Unfortunately,this suggestion is not
grounded in the realities of the LPD. Comstat requires a data-saturated environment, sophisticated
computers and software, at least bi-weekly meetings, and hour-by-hour analyses of"crime spikes,"to name
a few of its characteristics. It should be clear that the LPD,with a current total of 47 Sworn Officers,
totally lacks the resources and organizational complexity to implement a Comstat System. David
Weisburd et al,"The Growth of Comstat in American Policing,"2001.The Police Foundation,
Washington,D.C.
lX The great Robert K.Merton noted that each action has intended and unintended consequences. Both
need to be considered when policy decisions are made and public action is taken.Robert K.Merton. 1957.
Social Theory and Social Structure.New York: Collier-McMillan Ltd.
X It is now documented that some of the deaths of 343 firefighters could have been prevented on September
11th,2001 in New York City.Police helicopters above the World Trade Center radioed their concern about
the stability of the Twin Towers 21 minutes before the South Tower fell. Hundreds of firefighters did not
receive the warning because they were using a different radio system. Also, in Littleton,Colorado,police,
fire and medical units rushing to the scene of the Columbine High School shooting were unable to
communicate because of a tangle of different radios on different channels.
Xl Basic level EMTs(BLS)are capable of treating various medical emergencies before a patient reaches the
hospital. Their work includes wound care, oxygen administration, cervical spine immobilization,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation,and the ability to recognize many life threatening emergencies. Advanced
Life Support(ALS)EMTs are trained to provide additional life saving procedures: the use of a semi-
automatic external defibrillator(SAED),and the administration of a preset amount of epinephrine to a
victim of anaphylactic shock. Anaphylaxis is an acute, often explosive, systemic reaction that occurs in a
previously sensitized person who again receives the sensitizing agent(e.g.bee stings,peanuts, etc).
Symptoms develop between only to 15 minutes. There is difficulty breathing due to laryngeal edema or
bronchospasm. The manifestations of shock can develop within another 1 to 2 minutes. The affected
59
person may become convulsive,unresponsive and may die. Primary cardiovascular collapse can occur.
Reactions range from mild to severe. Immediate treatment with epinephrine is imperative(The Merck
Manual,16th Ed.,Rahway,NJ: Merck Research Laboratories).
X11 NFPA 1710 4.1.2.1.1 states: "the fire department shall establish the following time objectives: (1) one
minute(60 seconds)for turnout time;(2)Four minutes(240 seconds)or less for the arrival of the first
arriving engine company at a fire suppression incident and/or 8 minutes(480)seconds or less for the
deployment of a full first alarm assignment at a fire suppression incident; (3)Four minutes(240 seconds)or
less for the arrival of a unit with first responder or higher level capability at an emergency medical incident;
(4)Eight minutes(480 seconds)or less for the arrival of an advanced life support unit at an emergency
medical incident,where this service is provided by the fire department. NFPA 1710 5.2.3.1.1 states: "The
fire department's fire suppression resources shall be deployed to provide for the arrival of an engine
company within a 4-minute response time and/or the initial full alarm assignment within an 8-minute
response time to 90 percent of the incidents",and NFPA 1710 5.2.3.2.1 states: "The fire department shall
have the capability to deploy an initial full alarm assignment within an 8-minute response time to 90
percent of the incidents..."The 2 In/Out standard requires that anytime two firefighters are inside a burning
building,two firefighters must be on the outside at all times.
X111 The LFD uses approximately 1,300 hours overtime(OT)per month or 15,600 hours per year. Using the
rate of$34.50 per hour requires$538,200 OT per year. Given that the current 2005 budget has$439,383
available,there is a shortfall of$98,817. But this amount does not take into consideration callbacks,
training,Fire Academy costs for training new employees,mandatory paramedic training,and reserve funds
for storms and Town details.
'When the 2004 Override was reaching a fever pitch,the Chief,with no clerk to file or keep statistics,
was asked by a resident who walked into the Fire Station,to furnish statistics on the basis of which a
warrant could be written for Town Meeting,to keep the East Lexington Fire Station closed.
XV In the fall of 2003,a pedestrian hit my a motor vehicle lay helpless and bleeding on Bedford Street for 16
minutes for an ALS ambulance to respond from Woburn.